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Large scale distributed computing systems have been extensively utilized to host critical applications in the ﬁelds of national defense, ﬁnance, scientiﬁc research, commerce,
etc. However, applications in distributed systems face the risk of service outages due to
inevitable faults. Without proper fault management methods, faults can lead to signiﬁcant revenue loss and degradation of Quality of Service (QoS). An ideal fault management
solution should guarantee fast and accurate fault diagnosis, scalability in distributed systems, portability for a variety of systems, and the versatility of recovering different types
of faults.
This dissertation presents a model-based fault management structure which automatically recovers computing systems from faults. This structure can recover a system from
common faults while minimizing the impact on the system’s QoS. It covers all stages of
fault management including fault detection, identiﬁcation and recovery. It also has the
ﬂexibility to incorporate various fault diagnosis methods. When faults occur, the approach

identiﬁes fault types and intensity, and it accordingly computes the optimal recovery plan
with minimum performance degradation, based on a cost function that deﬁnes performance
objectives and a predictive control algorithm. The fault management approach has been
veriﬁed on a centralized Web application testbed and a distributed big data processing
testbed with four types of simulated faults: memory leak, network congestion, CPU hog
and disk failure. The feasibility of the fault recovery control algorithm is also veriﬁed. Simulation results show that our approach enabled effective automatic recovery from faults.
Performance evaluation reveals that CPU and memory overhead of the fault management
process is negligible.
To let domain engineers conveniently apply the proposed fault management structure
on their speciﬁc systems, a component-based modeling environment is developed. The
meta-model of the fault management structure is developed with Uniﬁed Modeling Language as an abstract of a general fault recovery solution for computing systems. It deﬁnes
the fundamental reusable components that comprise such a system, including the connections among them, attributes of each component and constraints. The meta-model can
be interpreted into a user-friendly graphic modeling environment for creating application
models of practical domain speciﬁc systems and generating executable codes on them.

Key words: Fault Tolerance, Self-healing Systems, Autonomic Computing, Fault Diagnosis, Quality of Service, Component-based Modeling
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation
Recently, the power of computing has been tremendously improved to enable the preva-

lence of large scale distributed computing systems which are hosting critical applications,
such as national defense, scientiﬁc research, online commerce, stock exchange, etc. These
enterprise systems require rigorous standards of availability, reliability and Quality of Service (QoS) guarantee. However, faults in modern computing systems are inevitable due to
their large scale, heterogeneity, complex conﬁgurations as well as potential human errors
[35]. Without proper fault management mechanisms, they can lead to signiﬁcant revenue
loss and degradation of QoS. For instance, global Facebook users experienced a 2.5-hour
outage due to a database failure on Sep. 23rd, 2010 [56]; An Amazon 49-minute outage in January 2013 led to approximately 5 million US dollars in sales loss [23]. More
examples of real-world distributed system downtime can be found in the report of International Working Group on Cloud Computing Resiliency [43]. Traditional administration
with human intervention requires administrators to have sufﬁcient expertise in workload
prediction, system response, performance optimization, fault diagnosis, etc. However, traditional administration is error prone and even infeasible due to the increasing system scale
and complexity.
1

In order to alleviate the shortcomings of manual fault administration, research communities have made great efforts on designing and developing distributed systems that can
maintain reliability, availability and QoS performance without any human intervention.
VMware’s vSphere [7], IBM’s Autonomic Computing [63], HP’s Adaptive Infrastructure
[4], and Cloudera Enterprise [2] are instances of self-managing industry products. Techniques employed by both industry and academia address the issues of mathematical modeling of system behaviors, as well as fault detection and diagnosis with statistical or machine
learning methods. These techniques usually help the system manager give appropriate
recovery actions to meet required reliability and availability objectives.

1.2

Challenges
Performance and fault condition of a computing system can be estimated based on

mathematical models. Speciﬁcally, a system performance model reveals the relationship
among environment inputs, control inputs, and performance related system metrics, while
a fault model is a general mechanism that identiﬁes a fault as per the change of fault
related system parameters with the progress of a failure. The accuracy of these models are
supported by precise knowledge of fault parameters, system conﬁguration, measurements
of resource usage, constraints, and their dependencies. However, it is difﬁcult to develop an
accurate performance model or fault model because of dynamic variation of environment
inputs, the high-dimensional nature of performance metrics and fault parameters, as well
as the complex relationship among performance, fault occurrence, system metrics and fault
parameters.
2

Another major challenge lies in the tradeoff between fault impacts and recovery action
penalties. The level of performance degradation brought by a fault is highly related to the
fault intensity. A recovery action is supposed to heal the system with minimum performance penalty. However, such a recovery action usually has negative effects on the system
due to extra resource allocation, short term system unavailability (e.g, to restart a node),
and additional service charge (e.g., to use more computing nodes from a cloud provider
as replica). An intensive recovery action may cost more than a moderate action in a short
term. On the other hand, an insufﬁcient recovery action may have less short term penalty,
but it will cost more in a long term since the fault is not completely removed. As a result, it
is important to evaluate the short term and long term penalties of a recovery action, given
the current fault class and intensity. Based on this evaluation, a method to select the most
appropriate recovery action is needed, which can ﬁnd the balance point with respect to a
user deﬁned tradeoff.
The third challenge is that, large scale computing systems are different from each other
in terms of the deployment architecture, workload, system model, applications, monitored
metrics and QoS standards. Therefore, it is extremely difﬁcult to develop a fault management method that handles both performance optimization and fault recovery for each of
the different application scenarios.

1.3

Research Approach
As a solution to the previously described fault management issues, a generic fault man-

agement structure is needed to automatically tackle fault problems while maintaining QoS
3

performance, which can be reused in various classes of computing systems. System modeling, fault detection, fault diagnosis and fault recovery are four typical stages involved in
model-based fault management. The generic fault management structure should integrate
these stages to handle most common and unknown faults, as well as the complex dynamics
of computing systems. It can be conﬁgured according to the deployed application requirements and the operating environment.
This dissertation focuses on designing state-of-the-art techniques for developing such
a generic fault management system. It needs to include the procedures required for a
holistic management cycle based on the measurements gathered from a system, the variety
of tolerable faults and the requirements for effective recovery. The management process
should also consider the beneﬁts and drawbacks of each control input, the criticality of
each fault, and the short and long term effects of both control actions and fault symptoms.
The performance degradation should be minimized during the fault recovery process.
Another goal of this dissertation is to develop a component-based modeling environment which aims at facilitating the design, implementation, maintenance and deployment of the proposed fault management structure for various domain speciﬁc applications.
Model-Integrated Computing (MIC) tools [6] are applied to develop such a componentbased modeling environment. The MIC was presented in order to associate the development of software with physical systems, so that they can evolve together [81]. Usually,
MIC utilizes a two-level development process. On the ﬁrst level, software or system designers develop domain-independent abstract models (i.e., meta-models) that specify conﬁgurations and their relationships for an entire class of problems. On the second level,
4

domain engineers apply the meta-models as an environment to create and analyze domainspeciﬁc models and develop applications as needed.

1.4

Contribution
In computing systems, faults can happen at the system hardware (e.g., disk failures,

congested network, etc.) or software (e.g., middleware, Web service layer, etc.) [14]. Nevertheless, traditional specialized methods and tools for fault management can not ﬁt all the
fault situations. This research aims to develop a generic model-based fault management
structure to optimize performance and deal with a wide range of faults autonomously in
computing systems. The research has resulted in architectures and algorithms that performs fault detection, diagnosis and recovery, while optimizing performance to meet QoS
requirements. The key research contributions are as follows:
1. Fault Detection and Diagnosis Methods: A distance based fault detection method
has been developed for fast online early stage detection of faults. Upon detection, the
controller can isolate the fault and maintain the maximum system availability. Also,
Naive Bayesian Network is used to diagnose faults, which provides accurate information about fault class and intensity. This fault information will help the controller
select the most optimal fault recovery approach.
2. Formulation of the Generic Fault Management structure: A generic structure
has been developed that covers the entire fault detection, diagnosis and recovery processes. The structure components, operational domain, formal settings and system
behaviors are deﬁned. The proposed structure can be applied to common distributed
computing systems and handle a wide range of faults.
3. A Predictive Fault Recovery Control Algorithm: A limited lookahead fault recovery control algorithm has been developed to predict future system states and calculate the best recovery action and performance tuning action, in terms of minimizing
revenue cost and maximizing QoS. The cost is estimated with cost functions, considering both the short term and long term impacts of faults and control inputs.
4. Validation of the Fault Management structure: The proposed structure is validated on a centralized Web application testbed and a distributed big data processing testbed. Faults such as memory leaks and network congestions are successfully
5

identiﬁed and removed. Based on the Hadoop performance model and node level diagnosis, future system states can be estimated which enables the controller to select
proper recovery solutions using the predictive control approach. The controller executes the recovery plan while continuously optimizes performance, which maintains
the QoS guarantee.
5. A Component-based Modeling Environment for the Proposed Fault Management Structure: The Generic Modeling Environment (GME) [50] is used to develop
the graphic modeling environment. The architecture of the underlying fault management structure is implemented by meta-models in GME, including the related
components, constraints, and attributes. With the help of meta-models, a succinct
graphic environment is provided to domain engineers which hides complex technical details and allows engineers to create applications for their customized systems
by only selecting necessary components and their attribute conﬁgurations. Codes
will be generated from the application model that can be ported to the target system
as an implementation of the proposed structure.

1.5

Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, the background of fault tolerance for computing systems and earlier re-

search contributions of academia and industry are introduced. In Chapter 3, the formal
settings of the proposed fault management structure are described in details, including the
control algorithm, operating region, and a complete management process. Implementations of the fault management structure are provided in Chapter 4, with experiment results.
In Chapter 5, the design of a component-based modeling environment for fault management is presented. The dissertation will conclude in Chapter 6 with a discussion of future
work.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK

In this chapter, preliminaries about fault management will be introduced, along with
historical research efforts in this broad area which are related to this dissertation.

2.1

Preliminaries
Basic concepts relating to fault management are introduced in this section.

2.1.1

Fault, Failure and Error

The terms fault, failure and error are extensively used in the ﬁeld of fault tolerance
which have distinctive meanings [15]. In this dissertation, fault and failure are treated
identically, which are deﬁned as hardware defects or software bugs in the system. This
is the root cause of unexpected degradation of Quality of Service (QoS). An error is the
manifestation of a fault, which is observable by the diagnosis unit when the system can not
meet the service promises [24]. A fault can not be detected until it manifests itself into an
error. For instance, incipient faults, like memory leaks, will not impact system performance
at the early stage. When it devours a signiﬁcant amount of memory, a resource outage will
occur and an error is manifested. The underlying fault management approach relies on the
errors to diagnose the original faults, and provides recovery solutions based on that.
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2.1.2

Objectives

The objective of fault management is to improve the dependability of the target system.
Typically, dependability covers four aspects: availability, reliability, safety, and maintainability [82]. Availability refers to the probability that a system can operate correctly at any
given moment. Reliability refers to the probability that a system can continuously work
without faults during a time interval. Safety means if the system fails, the underlying performance degradation can be controlled at the minimum level. Maintainability reﬂects the
level of effort needed to repair the system from common failures.
Critical systems (e.g., aircrafts) require high reliability, since even a momentary fault
may result in a severe disaster. However, it is not realistic to expect a large scale data center
or a cloud infrastructure to be fault free. It is usually acceptable that a fault comes up in a
computing system, but it has to be isolated and ﬁxed within reasonable time, which relies
on high maintainability. Otherwise, an unavailable system brings up service outage, and
it will ﬁnally induce heavy revenue loss. The proposed approach focuses on building a
dependable system with maximum availability, safety and maintainability.

2.1.3

Key Terms

The term system in this dissertation refers to a computing entity that is used to process
user requests, store and analyze data, or perform intensive computing tasks. The scale of a
system can be very small (e.g., a single node), ultra large (e.g., a cloud infrastructure with
tens of thousands of nodes), or somewhere in between. As a result, a fault can be identiﬁed
at different levels of granularity according to the system scale. For example, it can relate
8

to a computer component such as a hard disk failure for a small scale system, and also it
can be seen as an unavailable node, or even an abnormal cluster for large scale systems.
The fault level should be determined by the fault management approach as per the scale of
the system and the implementation domain. A fault manager in charge of a large cluster
prefers high level fault identiﬁcation, while a local manager deals with faults identiﬁed at
ﬁner granularity.
The proposed structure uses states to describe system behaviors and how a system
meets or deviates from QoS requirements. A system state is represented by a vector of
system variables (CPU utilization, network throughput, memory usage, response time, etc.)
at a certain moment. It can be sampled by a monitoring tool with a sampling interval. Environment inputs in this dissertation refer to user requests and data analysis jobs submitted
to a system. A control input means a performance optimization action or a recovery action
that actuates control knobs in a system to improve QoS or remove a fault, respectively.
Fault related parameters are system model parameters that remain constant at normal conditions and change with faults. A system model is a mathematical representation of the
relationship between the next system state, and the current system state, control inputs,
environment inputs, as well as fault related parameters.

2.1.4

Distributed System

A distributed system (DS) is usually deﬁned as “a collection of independent computers that appears to its users as a single coherent system” [82]. It consists of a number of
computers connected by a network and various applications installed on one or some com9

puters in the system. A computer in a DS is usually called a node, which can be either
physical or virtual. Figure 2.1 [82] shows a typical distributed system with three nodes.
Application A resides on Computer 1, while Application B is distributed on Computer 2
and 3. The middleware is a software layer between operating systems and applications that
can provide uniﬁed application interfaces for heterogeneous computers and networks. In
this case, users can access distributed applications without knowing the exact application
location and its computer conﬁguration. In other words, users perceive the DS as a single
computer, which is the transparency property of a DS.
Typical applications implemented in DSs include cloud storage services (e.g., Dropbox), video streaming services (e.g., YouTube), etc. MapReduce, a widely used DS application framework will be introduced in Section 2.1.5.

Distributed System
Computer 1

Computer 2

Application A

Computer 3
Application B

Middleware
Local OS 1

Local OS 2

Local OS 3

Network

User

Figure 2.1
A Typical Distributed System
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2.1.5

Distributed Data Processing

The boost of mobile devices and Internet applications have generated a tremendous
amount of data in the cloud. By mining big data, Internet companies such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and others run their core business which greatly improves user experience
and the quality of people’s contemporary cyber lifestyle. However, traditional decision
support databases are not able to meet the scaling requirements of storing and analyzing
big data. To sufﬁce increasing demands of big data processing in the information technology industry, Google developed MapReduce [36], a parallel and distributed programming
model for large scale data processing, which powers the featured Google search service.
Another beneﬁt of MapReduce is that it allows programs to run on inexpensive commodity
computers, which signiﬁcantly lowers the cost of hosting a cloud service.
Programs submitted to MapReduce have two core functions: Map and Reduce. Map
functions take key-value pairs as input, and output intermediate key-value pairs. Reduce
functions fetch all intermediate key-value pairs that associated with a speciﬁc key, and
generate the ﬁnal key-value result. Thus, a MapReduce program is executed in two main
phases: Map Phase and Reduce Phase, both of which include several sub-phases (details
will be introduced in Section 4.2.3). The input, intermediate and output data of all the
phases is stored in Distributed File System (DFS) which is designed for scaling big data in
distributed computing systems. In the MapReduce framework, a data processing program
is deﬁned as a job, while the map and reduce functions of a job are deﬁned as tasks. A
MapReduce cluster has the master-slave structure. The master node carries a JobTracker
daemon that divides input data, assigns tasks to slave nodes, and coordinates slaves to
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generate the ﬁnal result properly. A TaskTracker daemon on the slave nodes manages
local map and/or reduce executions, and allocates resources in the form of slots that deﬁne
the maximum number of running tasks. In this research, Hadoop [1], the most popular
open source implementation of MapReduce, is selected as the big data processing solution,
which is being used by many well known institutions for both commercial and academic
purposes, such as Amazon, EBay, Twitter, Cornell, etc [5]. The Hadoop version of DFS
(HDFS) is the ﬁle system that stores data.
Hadoop node faults can be categorized into the following three types [75]: Task Faults
which correspond to interruption of a running mapper or reducer due to bad records, resource contention and database corruption, Worker Faults which corresponds to hardware
failures in a worker node (memory leak, CPU hog, hard disk failures, etc.), and Master
Faults which is the single point of failure on the master node, that usually contains the
jobtracker and namenode. Hadoop has a built-in fault tolerance feature called speculative
execution. When a task is slowed down due to faults in the node (e.g., hardware malfunction, software errors, etc.), speculative execution (SE) will run the task at a duplicated
node. Whichever result comes ﬁrst from nodes running the same task, it will be used by
the reducer, while all the other late results will be discarded. However, the SE mechanism does not handle faults properly in heterogeneous environments [89]. It also lacks the
ability of using resources efﬁciently [58]. The proposed research extends the model-based
fault management structure, which can work decentralized at local nodes and consider
both performance optimization and fault recovery. As an alternative to SE, the underlying
framework uses a fault tolerance control algorithm to select the best recovery action that
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has minimal impacts on performance and the maximum efﬁciency of resource usage. It
can also ﬁt heterogeneous systems in the sense that decentralized fault manager diagnoses
faults and calculates related cost according to the local fault model and cost model.

2.1.6

Fault Taxonomy

In literature, the fault taxonomy follows different criteria. Avizienis et al. in [15]
categorized faults into three groups:
1. development faults that caused in the process of development
2. physical faults that relate to hardware malfunction
3. interaction faults that due to external operations

Another representative taxonomy is presented by Ardagna et al. in [14]. In this work,
faults are categorized into the following levels:
1. infrastructure and middleware level that includes faults in the hardware and software infrastructure
2. Web service level that consists of faults during Web service invocation, execution
and coordination
3. Web application level that incorporates faults caused by malfunctional Web applications.

In this dissertation, faults are categorized in the following form as a synthesis of the
existing fault taxonomy methods.
1. hardware faults that caused by defective computer components, such as hard disk
failures and network congestion
2. software and system faults that occur due to poor written programs or erroneous
software conﬁgurations in different software layers, such as memory leaks and CPU
hogs
13

2.2

Related Work
Research on fault tolerance in computing systems usually addresses system and fault

modeling, fault prediction, fault diagnosis and fault recovery. This research focuses on (1)
modeling the target system’s behavior for state prediction, (2) detection/diagnosis methods
for fast and accurate fault identiﬁcation, (3) a mechanism for planning a recovery action
with the minimum performance degradation, and (4) a holistic model-based structure that
can handle generic fault problems. In literature, related work can be classiﬁed into four
major categories:
1. General fault detection/diagnosis techniques
2. Fault recovery methods for general computing systems
3. Fault recovery methods for cloud computing

2.2.1

Fault Detection/Diagnosis Techniques

In this research, fault detection means early stage symptom recognition which does
not require an accurate classiﬁcation of the fault, while fault diagnosis aims at detailed
information about fault class and intensity. However, in literature the terms detection and
diagnosis are usually used interchangeably to represent the general process where faults
are monitored and the root cause is identiﬁed. Many artiﬁcial intelligence and statistical
methods are tailored to be applied in this ﬁeld.

2.2.1.1

Techniques for Hardware Faults

Rish et al. [76] introduced an adaptive probing approach that detects node failures in a
distributed system. The proposed approach selects probes with the maximum information
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gain in a distributed system, based on Dynamic Bayesian Network. An intelligent probing
approach that can dynamically locate computer network failures with a Bayesian based
inference technique was presented in [21]. Kandula et al. presented a NetMedic system
[59] for fault diagnosis in enterprise networks, which can formulate the detailed diagnosis
as an inference problem. In [42], Gafsi et al. modeled server reliability using continuous
time Markov Chains for both independent disk failures and dependent component failures.

2.2.1.2

Techniques for Software and System Faults

In [49], Ide et al. presented an approach that treated a Web-based system as a weighted
graph and used graph mining techniques to monitor the graph sequences for failure detection in the Web application level. Cherkasova et al. in [30] proposed an anomaly detection
method for enterprise applications based on a regression transaction model and an application performance signature. In [61], Kavulya et al. presented the Gumshoe diagnosis system that aimed at problem isolation in replicated ﬁle systems. It periodically collects OSlevel and protocol-level measurements, and then analyzes and cross-correlates them across
the replica nodes to automatically isolate the ﬁle system faults. The Pinpoint project [28]
proposed two statistical techniques that can be applied in the Java EE Web-based systems
with the purpose of analyzing the request path shapes and component interactions to detect
failures. A bit-encoding memory leak detection method was used to encode per program
site [16], and then memory leak can be detected when the program site is decoded. Xu
et al. in [87, 86] presented a container-based memory leak detection technique for Java
programs. The revised graph mining method was used to diagnose memory leaks in [71].
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2.2.1.3

Techniques for General Faults

Cohen et al. in [33] provided indexable signatures extracted from a running system
to distill the essential fault characteristics, which allows operators to identify and quantify
the frequency of recurrent problems. In [32], Cohen et al. provided a simpliﬁed Bayesian
network to model the dependency relationships of system attributes as an attempt to deal
with the complexity of systems models, and then achieved automatic correlation among
variables and the Service Level Agreement (SLA) violations. Zheng et al. developed a
fault root cause analysis approach for large HPC systems based on the server logs in [90].
Dean et al. in [34] presented a novel method to learn system behaviors and predict unknown anomalies using Self-Organizing Maps. In [54], time series analysis was applied
to observe the dependency relationships among system variables for fault detection in distributed transaction systems. In [60], Kang et al. proposed a tool named PeerWatch for
fault detection and diagnosis for virtualized consolidation systems which extracted the correlated characteristics among multiple application instances. Lan et al. applied principal
component analysis and independent component analysis to detect node level anomalies
[66].

2.2.2

Fault Recovery Methods

In this category, the methods focus on how a generic system can be recovered from
faults (i.e., self-healing). A typical self-healing computing system includes processes of
health maintenance, failure discovery and system recovery [44]. The Recovery Oriented
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Computing project [25] is an example of this category in which methods on fault isolation
as well as redundancy for fault containment and recovery are proposed.

2.2.2.1

Methods for Hardware Faults

Herder et al. in [46] developed a ﬂexible ﬁlter-driver framework to deal with the driver
failures in the storage stack. In [67] Lee et al. proposed a framework with two protocols,
forward erasure correction and on-demand correction, to support server-level fault tolerance in parallel video servers with the push architecture. Jo et al. in [55] proposed a device
driver fault tolerance scheme for virtual machines. A separate virtual machine carrying the
device driver can migrate to healthy nodes if there is a fault. Keeton et al. presented an
automated solution in [62], which can deal with failures of storage devices in data centers.
This solution built models for data protection alternatives based on dependability metrics,
and it quantiﬁed cost of protection methods, data loss and service outages. Appropriate
protection methods will be selected automatically which have the minimum overall cost.

2.2.2.2

Methods for Software and System Faults

Bond et al. presented a Java oriented memory leak tolerating approach in [17], which
handles a memory leak by moving a stale object to the hard disk. Nagarajan et al. in [73]
designed a proactive fault tolerance mechanism for large-scale parallel computing systems
based on Xen virtualization. Liu et al. provided a fault tolerant framework for composition
of transactional Web services in [69]. Bucchiarone et al. in [22] presented their work on the
combination of fault tolerance and testing to remove software faults in component-based
systems. Mahadevan et al. in [70] presented a two-level (component and system) software
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health management architecture based on ARINC-653 Component Model. This framework
provides the functions of detecting, diagnosing and mitigating failures in the two levels,
with the help of a model-based reasoner and searching techniques. Rodrı́guez et al. in
[77] presented a Web application level fault tolerant technique based on Uniﬁed Modeling
Language, which considers the performance degradation of a recovery action. In [31],
Ciancone et al. presented the model-based KlaperSuite framework providing reliability
prediction for component-based software systems. Bouteiller et al. developed a checkpoint
Application Program Interface (API) which detects and manages simultaneous failures in
the Remote Procedure Call for Grid Computing (GridRPC) middleware [19]. Carzaniga
et al. provided an automatic method to select correct redundant software components to
deal with software faults [26]. Di et al. built a mathematical model of the multi-level
checkpoint/restart mechanism for large-scale fault management: the best checkpoint level
combination and intervals are selected with optimization criteria [39].

2.2.2.3

Methods for General Faults

In [74], Pan et al. developed a dynamic workﬂow management framework for the
real time system data distribution services based on the heartbeat, which can fulﬁll node
level fault recovery. Ehrig et al. in [40] presented a modeling approach for self-healing
systems using algebraic graph transformation, which includes formal analysis and veriﬁcation. Chen et al. advocated a fault tolerant MPI method with diskless checkpointing
to provide node self-healing in [29]. Another checkpointing based fault management approach for high performance parallel computing was introduced in Lan et al.’s work [65]. It
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can choose proactive or reactive actions to deal with faults according to the corresponding
cost of each action. Chandra et al. discussed fault monitoring and analysis for large-scale
systems, which has the ability of uncovering fault causes [27]. Deng et al. [38] presented
a fault tolerant strategy for scientiﬁc computing, which decomposes matrix multiplication
into subtasks and distributes them to proper clouds.

2.2.3

Fault Tolerance Methods for Cloud Computing

Cloud computing is gaining momentum as a promising architecture which provides
powerful and ﬂexible computing resources, yet lowers cost to a reasonable level. Fault
tolerance for cloud computing faces new challenges due to the cloud’s nature of large
scale and high complexity, as well as the massive size of sensitive data stored in clouds.
Hacker in [45] modeled the service load of a cloud computing system, and then modeled
the reliability and availability of cloud services. Sun et al. in [80] provided systematically analysis of fault tolerance in clouds as well as a check-pointing and replication based
strategy. Jhawar et al. in [53] presented a novel idea of ”Fault Tolerance as a Service”,
which means faults are managed by a third-party service provider and it ﬁts the cloud environment well. This work consists of a graph based resource manager and a replication
based fault management scheme, but neither the rules to select fault tolerance solutions nor
potential revenue loss was addressed. Deng et al. [38] presented a fault tolerant strategy
for scientiﬁc computing, which decomposes matrix multiplication into subtasks and distributes them to proper clouds. For big data applications, Sangroya et al. [78] developed
a comprehensive Hadoop dependability benchmark suite which can simulate real-world
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applications, inject various types of faults, provide workloads with different levels and
evaluate reliability statistics. Ko et al. presented a fault tolerant technique to guarantee the
availability of intermediate data in Hadoop applications [64]. Yang et al. [88] solved the
namenode single-point-of-failure problem for Hadoop by using heartbeat and Distributed
Replicated Block Device on distributed virtual machines. In [75], Quiané-Ruiz et al. proposed a family of recovery algorithms for Hadoop online fault management. The metadata
collection is fast checkpointed, where the checkpoints are piggybacked on the materialization of intermediate results. Kadirvel et al. in [57] used dynamic resource scaling to
proactively reduce fault penalties in Hadoop applications. As an extension of their work,
Kadirvel et al. used sparse coding to detect node level faults in Hadoop clusters [58].

2.2.4

Summary

Many research efforts have been devoted in fault detection and diagnosis for computing systems. However, these methods are only design for speciﬁc classes of faults and/or
applications. Existing recovery oriented methods and fault tolerance methods for cloud
computing do not support the full set of recovery actions needed to deal with general
classes of faults. Also, these comprehensive methods lack the consideration of recovery
cost due to performance degradation during recovery, and they support only a single recovery action ([67, 46, 55, 17, 70, 40, 74, 29, 26, 38]). The work in [69] can select various
exception handling strategies based on Event-Condition-Action rules, but the related cost
of different rules is not explicitly quantiﬁed. In [58], dynamic resource scaling is used
as the recovery action and its cost is considered. However, their work lacks other fault
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handling actions which may have less recovery cost. Research contributions addressing
recovery cost and supporting multiple recovery actions usually focus on speciﬁc systems:
the fault management techniques for parallel computing [65], Web applications [77], and
data storage devices [62].
This dissertation aims at developing a holistic model-based fault management structure that complements existing fault management approaches and extends their application
scopes. It automatically handles both software and hardware faults, manages general systems with different applications, and possesses the scalability to be utilized in a large scale
distributed system. It has the ﬂexibility of incorporating existing fault detection methods as
a diagnosis module for fault identiﬁcation, and possesses a set of recovery actions to handle different fault situations. A fault control algorithm in this structure can select a proper
recovery action based on diagnosis information, which minimizes performance degradation during fault management given a system cost model and Service Level Agreement
(SLA), and balance the tradeoff between recovery cost and SLA penalties due to faults. To
facilitate domain engineers to conveniently apply the proposed fault management structure
on their speciﬁc systems, a component-based modeling environment will be developed.
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CHAPTER 3
A MODEL-BASED FAULT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the proposed model-based autonomic fault management structure, which incorporates fault detection, fault diagnosis, and fault recovery. Components
of the structure the relationships among them will be introduced. In the proposed management structure, a system model, an environment input forecasting model and a fault model
facilitate the prediction of future system states, which are used by a predictive fault control
algorithm to select a recovery action while minimizing performance degradation.

3.1

The Fault Management Structure
The proposed fault management structure is motivated and inspired by real-life fault

problems. Consider, for instance, a database fragmentation fault which is caused by breaking up related data into fragments on a disk after a large number of data modiﬁcations.
It increases disk seek time and rotational delay [83]. Thus the system performance is
gradually degraded by increased response time and decreased disk I/O throughput. A fragmentation fault, similar to most faults, will therefore not only induce an SLA penalty as
the performance is degraded below a threshold, but also waste valuable resources such as
CPU time, energy, and etc. A fault management mechanism should handle such a situation by detecting the fragmentation existence promptly, diagnosing the fault type correctly,
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addressing fault causes, and recovering the system back to the normal condition with the
minimum negative effect on performance. As for the database fragmentation example, this
can be achieved by locating the faulty node and conducting a defragmentation with the
least SLA penalty.
To enable automatic fault management for computing systems, the model-based fault
management structure is proposed as shown in Figure 3.1. The main components in the
proposed fault management structure are the Physical System, the Environment Monitor,
the System Model, the Diagnoser and the Controller. Their properties, effective data sets
and interactions with each other are described in this section.
When a computing system has a fault, it will be detected by the diagnoser with the
help of fault models for known faults. The controller optimizes system performance and
recovers it from faults with regard to a system model. During the fault recovery process,
the diagnoser reports the fault information to the controller, which selects a control action
with the minimum cost according to predeﬁned cost functions.

3.1.1

Physical System

The physical system is a computing system to be managed by the fault management
structure. Although the managed computing system can be distributed with many nodes,
the Physical System part in Figure 3.1 illustrates how a single computing node is managed
by our approach.
The computing node is composed of a set of software (e.g., operating system, middleware, productive applications, etc.) and hardware components (e.g., CPU, memory, hard
23
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drive, etc.) which processes jobs submitted to it. The computing node interacts with the
control structure via a set of sensors and actuators. In the proposed structure, sensors are
a set of software processes running in the local background, which periodically report the
measurements to the System Model module and Fault Diagnoser module. The types of
sensor measurements (e.g., CPU utilization, network throughput, etc.) are selected based
on patterns of known fault impacts on the system and QoS related metrics. They are used
to facilitate fault diagnosis and performance optimization. Actuators include two categories: (1) a set of local software tuning knobs that can change the node running status
(e.g., CPU frequency tunning, restarting, etc.) and (2) remote control software processes
which communicate with the replica manager. They are triggered by control actions sent
from the controller module. The replica manager coordinates passive replicas P Rx and active replicas ARx . When the actuator requests a replica, the replica manager will switch an
available machine into the physical system as a substitution. The Build-in Test (BIT) module comes with the manufacturer or system solution provider, which reports base hardware
(e.g., memory burned out) or software (e.g., OS crash) failures to the sensors.

3.1.2

Environment monitor

Computing systems interact with its operating environment in terms of inputs and responses. Environment inputs are usually time-varying and uncontrollable, such as user
requests to access an e-commerce website, and jobs submitted to a big data analysis system. It is usually impossible to assume an a priori distribution of such inputs. However,
in most cases the variations of environment inputs can be estimated effectively with cer25

tain accuracy using well-known forecasting approaches such as the Box-Jenkins ARIMA
model [37] and Kalman ﬁlters [20]. The main purpose of estimating environment inputs
is to enable the prediction of future system states with the help of a system model, then
the control algorithm can be applied to search the predicted state space and select a proper
fault recovery actions. In this dissertation, we only consider workloads (i.e., user requests)
as environment inputs. A workload forecasting model can be acquired through analysis
and simulations of a system in the deployed environment, which has the following form:
ˆ
λ(k)
= η(λ(k − 1, N ))

(3.1)

where λ̂(k) denotes the estimated value and λ(k − 1, N ) is the set of N previously observed environment inputs {λ(k − 1), . . . , λ(k − n)}. It is assumed that the parameters of
forecasting techniques are embedded in η. Hatted letters such as λ̂ will be used throughout
this dissertation to represent estimated variables. An ARIMA forecasting model is used in
this dissertation for workload estimation, which has the following form:
(1 −

p
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d

ρi L )(1 − L) λk = µ(1 −
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p
X
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ρi ) + (1 −

q
X

vj Lj )ek

(3.2)

j=1

In Equation 3.2, L is the lag operator where L1 λk = λk−1 , ρi , vj are weighting coefﬁcients,
µ is the time series mean value, and ek is the estimation error λk − λ̂k . Based on the historical information, the R statistical package [9] is used to automatically generate the most
ﬁtted ARIMA model online with the auto.arima() method and default constraints that
0 ≤ p ≤ 5, 0 ≤ q ≤ 5 and 0 ≤ d ≤ 2. Thus, λ(k) is estimated by this ARIMA model at
each sampling point.
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3.1.3

System model

The system model deﬁnes the relationship between system inputs and outputs. A system state is deﬁned as the set of variables that uniquely deﬁnes the current performance
level of the system. In typical computing systems, these include CPU utilization, network
throughput, number of threads, response time, etc. The set of all possible system states is
denoted by X ⊂ Rn . It is assumed that the system dynamics is generally non-linear and
event-driven, and can be described by the following discrete time equation:

x(k + 1) = h(x(k), u(k), λ(k), φ(k))

(3.3)

where λ(k) ∈ Λ ⊂ Rr denotes the environment input, x(k) ∈ X is the system state
variables, φ(k) ∈ Φ ⊂ Rr is the fault related parameters, and u(k) is the control action
from a predeﬁned ﬁnite set at time step k. In general, faults can affect the system dynamics
through changing the function h. However, in most situations we can assume such effects
can be realized, at least at the initial phases of failures (and until the control takes recovery
actions) via a set of parameters φ embedded in the system model as assumed here. It is
also assumed that the system is controlled by a set of performance optimization control
actions UP and a set of recovery actions UR . For example, UP may include tuning CPU
frequencies, allocating computing nodes in a cluster, etc; UR may include restarting a node,
using a replica to substitute a faulty node, etc. In general, UP ∩ UR 6= ∅. A control action
u is deﬁned hereafter as: u = [uP uR ], where uP ∈ UP , uR ∈ UR . The set of all possible
control actions is denoted by U = UP × UR and u(k) ∈ U . Without loss of generality, we
assume that the system output is an observable subset of system states.
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3.1.4

Diagnoser

The diagnoser is used to identify the current fault condition of the system as one of
the faults in the set F = {f0 , f1 , ..., fn , fu }, where f1 , f2 , . . . , fn represent known system
faults, f0 is reserved for the normal condition (i.e., no faults), and fu = unknown is reserved for an unknown fault. A fault diagnosis module compares the observed behavior of
the system, namely input and output data collected from system sensor, with the expected
behavior based on the system model. When the difference between observed and computed
behavior exceeds a certain threshold, the diagnoser will analyze the difference (residual)
to identify the causing fault and its impact on system parameters.
The proposed fault recovery control algorithm needs to predict future system states
under both normal and faulty conditions. In faulty conditions, a fault model is needed for
each fault class in addition to the system model to compute expected system states. A
general estimation model can be used as a fault model as follows:

φ(k + 1) = gf (φ(k), x(k), λ(k), u(k))

(3.4)

where gf is the fault model associated with f . Since each fault in F will have unique impact
on the system behavior, gf for each f ∈ F can be obtained by analysis and simulations
with the particular fault injected to the system intentionally. The estimated fault condition
and the corresponding parameter set are sent to the controller to compute the appropriate
response. The fault diagnosis process is usually associated with uncertainty. As such, the
estimated fault condition is associated with certain probability of accuracy. Monotonic
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diagnosis reasoning is assumed here. Consequently, diagnosis accuracy is non-decreasing
with time. Also, only a single failure is considered in our experiments.
For example, the fault set F may contain memory leak (f1 ) and network congestion
(f2 ). When a fault is identiﬁed, the corresponding fault model gf 1 or gf 2 will be used to
estimate φ(k). Since s(k) and β(k) are manifested in a short range during simulations
with f1 or f2 , gf 1 and gf 2 are simpliﬁed as the average value calculated from simulation
results. As for the unknown faults (fu ), there is no fault model associated with it because
it is impossible to predict unknown fault impacts. If a fault is classiﬁed as fu , conservative
recovery actions using active replicas will be directly applied.

3.1.5

Controller

The controller is used to (1) analyze the information sent from the diagnoser and the
system monitors, (2) tune the system parameters to optimize performance in normal conditions, and (3) compute an effective action to recover the system. To fulﬁll the above
duties, the controller maintains a set of cost functions (representing SLA requirements)
and estimates future system states (Figure 3.1). To ensure successful recovery, the class
of a fault and the underlying parameters are used by the controller to compute a proper
control action. More details about the controller will be described in Section 3.4.
In the context of this dissertation, fault classes (i.e., types) are identiﬁed based on the
affected hardware (e.g., memory leak, network congestion, disk failure, etc.). To ensure
successful recovery, the class of a fault and its intensity are utilized by the controller to
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compute a proper control action after the analysis. Details of how the control algorithm
works will be described in Section 3.4.

3.2

The Fault Management Problem
In this section, we outline the fault management problem from system theoretic per-

spectives. The formal introduction to the fault management problem presented here is
generic and applicable to wide variety of systems and fault adaptation approaches.

yno : normal and optimal
yn: normal, but not optimal
yo: optimal, but at fault
yx: neither normal nor optimal

x

Optimal

yn

Desired
Operating
Region

yo
yno

Normal

yx

φ
Figure 3.2
A Simpliﬁed Composite Space X × Φ Showing the Fault Management Objective

From a behavioral perspective, the space Y = X × Φ is used to evaluate a system’s
performance level and health status and y ∈ Y is deﬁned as a composite system state,
to differentiate it from the state variables x. In general, the desired operation region of
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the system is associated with a normal operation region in the space Φ and an optimal
performance region in the state space X. The intersection of the two regions deﬁnes the
goal of the controller. Figure 3.2 shows a simpliﬁed view of the composite space X × Φ,
in which the desired system setting (control goal) is highlighted. As the system operates in
uncertain conditions and is subject to faults, the current composite state can be outside the
desired region. Once the controller identiﬁes the current composite state of the system, it
will try to bring the system back to the desired region or as close as possible.
In normal conditions, the controller uses predictive control to steer the system from
suboptimal states (yn in Figure 3.2) to a desired state (yno ). In faulty conditions, the controller will utilize both the system model and the fault model (after the fault is identiﬁed)
to steer the system back to (or close to) the desired region (yo or yx to yno in Figure 3.2).
Note that, without taking into account the fault condition and the underlying fault
model, the controller can still try to conduct performance optimization by increasing usage
of computing resources (e.g., state transition from yx to yo in Figure 3.2). However, this
expediency will gradually exhaust resources and may lead to total system crash if the fault
is not eliminated.

3.2.1 Operation Regions
Fault management involves three main stages: fault detection, fault identiﬁcation and
fault recovery. To take into account the fault detection and identiﬁcation process we
consider a new (composite) operation state of the system and its environment, namely,
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z = [x φ λ]T ∈ Z, where Z = X × Φ × Λ. Figure 3.3 shows possible composite state
transitions in simpliﬁed operation state space Z throughout the fault management process.

Composite Space Z

λ
Known Fault Region ZF
Zf1

Zf2

Fault 1

Fault 2

Detection Region
E

C

ZD

Unknown Fault Region ZU

D

A

B

Normal Region ZN

y

Figure 3.3
A Simpliﬁed View of the Composite Operation Space Z and State Transitions between
Different Regions in this Space

In normal conditions, the current system parameter φ lies within the set ΦN ⊂ Φ of all
possible normal parameters. The normal region of the system, denoted by ZN , contains all
possible states of the system that follow Equation 3.3 for all possible values of environment
inputs and control actions under the normal range of system parameters.
The abnormal region contains all operation states of the system outside the normal
region. This region corresponds to faulty system conditions and can be divided into two
regions, namely, known fault and unknown fault regions. The known fault region, contains
the system dynamics corresponding to known faults. Let Φi ⊂ Φ be the set of fault pa-
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rameters corresponding to fault fi according the fault model gf i . The corresponding fault
region Zf i ⊂ Z is composed of all possible states of the system, per equations 3.3, for all
possible values of environment inputs and control actions and under the set Φi of system
parameters. For a fault set F , the known fault region ZF is given by:
ZF = ∪ni=1 Zf i

(3.5)

Unknown faults do not have a fault model. Therefore, the corresponding parameters
(for each unknown fault) are unknown. The region of unknown faults ZU is deﬁned by the
complete space Z excluding the normal region and the known fault region. Formally, ZU
is given by:
ZU = (ZF ∪ ZN )c

(3.6)

At the beginning stage of a fault occurrence, the system state will gradually deviate
from the normal region ZN and enter into either a known fault or the unknown fault region.
However, for small deviations although the diagnoser can detect the deviations from normal
dynamics, it cannot identify precisely the corresponding failure conditions, particularly for
incipient faults. We refer to such region in the state space as the detection region, denoted
by ZD ⊂ Z. Usually, ZD lies inside the anomaly regions ZNc close to the boundary between
normal states and faulty states, which is the shadowed area in Figure 3.3. The region ZD
depends on the diagnosis approaches implemented by the diagnoser.
State transitions between the fault management stages can be visualized as the point
movement in the system state space. Details are introduced in Section 3.3.
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3.3

Fault Management Process
Based on the discussion in the previous section, the fault management process has

to deal with four distinct operational regions of the system, namely, normal, detection,
known fault and unknown fault regions. The control setting for fault management depends
on the current operation region of the system as discussed in Section 3.2.1. As a result, a
complete fault management process consists of a normal phase, a detection phase, a known
fault phase, as well as an unknown fault phase.

3.3.1

Normal Phase

In the normal phase, the system is assumed to be free of faults. The controller optimizes
the performance with the predictive control algorithm, while the diagnoser provides early
warning of the fault occurrence. A fault occurrence can be recognized by the distance
deviation of z(k) from the normal region. Also, the diagnoser should make a decision
after the deviation is stable to avoid any noise and jitter. The normal region Zn ⊂ Z
is deﬁned by simulation and analysis of system dynamics at the normal condition under
various workloads. A deviation is deﬁned as
d(k) = min kz(k) − zk
z∈Zn

(3.7)

where d(k) is the shortest distance between z(k) and the normal region. If ∀t ∈ [0, τ ] :
d(k − t) > , where  ∈ R+ is a distance threshold, t ∈ N, and τ ∈ N is a predeﬁned stable
time threshold, the diagnoser will send a positive fault warning at time k and the system
will go to the detection phase. Time threshold τ is used to ﬁlter noisy data from sensors
which has similar characteristic to a faulty state (e.g., Trace B, Figure 3.3).
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3.3.2

Detection Phase

In this phase, the diagnoser based on deviations from normal dynamics identiﬁes that
a fault is in the system at its incipient stage, but the exact fault class is unknown. The controller continues to optimize performance based on current system state x. When d(k) ≤ ,
the system will go to the normal phase. When d(k) is greater than the threshold and
φ(k) ∈ Φd , the system will stay in the detection phase. Otherwise, fault diagnosis methods
will be used to identify the fault f . Suppose there are n known faults in the structure,
one of them f ∈ F will result in a transition from the detection phase to the known fault
phase, while an unknown fault fu will move the system to the unknown fault phase. The
control actions in this phase include performance optimization solutions such as CPU frequency tuning and load balancing. Further more, proactive fault control actions will also
be prepared for the incipient faults. For instance, enabling backup units, activating replica
servers, etc.

3.3.3

Known Fault Phase

In this phase the diagnoser has identiﬁed the fault class, the fault intensity and fault
related parameters φ̂(k). The fault model in Equation 3.4 will be used to compute the current system parameter φ(k) which will then be used in the system model to provide future
system state prediction. Some faults may share initial behavioral with other faults. Accordingly the diagnoser may need more time to conﬁrm the fault class. Based on the fault
information, the controller selects proper recovery actions in the set UR (e.g., applying a
replica server, using a spare network interface, etc.) and minimizes performance degrada35

tion during the recovery process by applying proper uP ∈ UP . The aim of the controller
is to bring the system back or as close as possible to the normal operating region. If fault
recovery actions are successful, the system will go back to the normal phase (e.g., Trace E
in Figure 3.3).

3.3.4

Unknown Fault Phase

In this phase, the fault ﬁngerprint does not match any records in the known fault library.
To maintain system availability and minimize the risk due to unknown faults, conservative
recovery actions will be conducted. For example, the faulty node will be isolated from
the system for further inspections by an administrator, and a replica will be activated as a
substitution.
The complete fault management work ﬂow is illustrated in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4
The Four-phase Control Process and Conditions for State Transition
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3.4

Fault Recovery Control Approach
The Fault Recovery Control (FRC) approach uses a ﬁnite number of recovery as well

as performance tuning actions to optimize performance in normal condition and to recover
the system from potential faults based on the information from the diagnoser. The controller queries the SLA Manager to ﬁnd out the exact cost of a control action and degraded
performance. The QoS speciﬁcations at the SLA Manager can be expressed as a set of
constraints and a cost function that assigns a cost to each system state considering the
overhead of the control action and the system health condition as represented by current
value of system parameters. The fault recovery control algorithm is an extension of the
predictive control method introduced in [10].
In this section, details about the controller’s principals will be disclosed, including cost
calculation, performance management and recovery plan selection.

3.4.1

Cost Functions

The fault recovery control algorithm aims to maintain high level efﬁciency and availability of the system. The control algorithm uses two cost functions that address both the
operational efﬁciency and availability aspects of system performance. The cost function
that addresses system availability is given by
JR (k) = kφ(k) − φn kA1 + kur (k)kB1 + kΔur (k)kC1
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(3.8)

where φn ∈ Φ represents a normal fault related parameter vector. Δur ∈ UR is the change
of a control action. k  kA is a proper norm with a weight A. The cost function for system
performance is given by
JP (k) = kx(k) − x∗ kA2 + kup (k)kB2 + kΔup (k)kC2

(3.9)

where x∗ ∈ X represents the desired optimal operation state of the system. Performance speciﬁcation also includes a set of constraints that deﬁnes the valid set of states,
denoted by H(x, k), and the corresponding valid set of inputs, denoted by I(x, k), at every
time step. The speciﬁcation may also include boundaries for JR and JP .

3.4.2 Fault Recovery Control Algorithm
The control algorithm tries to optimize the system performance by minimizing the
underlying cost functions described above under the given set of constraints on the state and
inputs at each time step. In general, system availability is more important than performance
degradation since faults can result in signiﬁcant performance decline or even total collapse
of the system. As such, we assign a priority value 0 < pf < 1 for fault impact cost due
to the fault f ∈ F . The fault recovery control framework shown in Figure 3.5 works as
follows.
• At each time step k, relevant environment variables λ such as workload arrival patterns are estimated by the environment module. Also current system parameters φ
are estimated by the Diagnoser module.
• The estimated values of λ and φ are used by the system model to forecast future
behavior over a look-ahead horizon, N . Future system states, in terms of x̂(k + j),
for a predetermined prediction horizon of j = 1, . . . , N steps are estimated during
each sampling instant k. These predictions depend on known values (past inputs and
outputs) up to the sampling instant k, and on the future control actions u(k + j), j =
0, . . . , N − 1.
38

• A sequence of valid control actions {u(k+j)} leading to the desired system behavior
is obtained at each step of the prediction horizon by optimizing the given speciﬁcation. The performance speciﬁcation will depend on the system operation phases as
follows.
Normal phase. In this phase the system is in normal operating conditions, and the
controller will minimize the cost function J = JP . Control actions in this case will
be selected from the set UN = UP × ∅.
Detection phase. In this phase the system is deviating incrementally from the normal
operating conditions due to incipient faults, but the exact cause is still unknown. The
controller will minimize the cost function J = JR + JP . This conservative approach
will enable the system to be prepared for the worst known fault condition quantiﬁed
by JR while continuously optimizing system performance quantiﬁed by JP . Control
actions in this case will be selected from the set UD = UP × URd where URd ⊂ UR
is the recovery action set (e.g., enabling backup units, activating replica servers,
etc.) dedicated to the early stages of fault detection when the deviation from normal
conditions is relatively small.
Known fault phase. In this phase, the diagnoser identiﬁes the existing fault as
a known fault f ∈ F . The controller will try to optimize the cost function J =
pf JR + (1 − pf )JP , where 0 < pf < 1 is the priority value associated with the fault
f . A lower priority value pf diminishes the system availability cost JR in J and
ampliﬁes the performance degradation cost JP . Control actions in this case will be
selected from the set U and the controller will try to bring the system back to normal
conditions while minimizing the impact on performance whenever possible during
the recovery process.
Unknown fault phase. The system is identiﬁed as faulty, but the exact fault is
unknown. Therefore, it is impossible to predict future states or use the proposed
lookahead control algorithm. Control actions in this case will be selected from the
set UU ⊂ UR , where all recovery actions are conservative for unknown faults (e.g.,
to isolate a node for manual inspection, to use a replica as a substitution, etc.).
• The control action u∗ (k) corresponding to the ﬁrst control action in the above sequence is applied as the input to the system during time k while the other inputs are
discarded. During the next sampling instant, the system state x(k + 1) is known and
the above steps are repeated again.
The algorithm in Table 3.1 shows the FRC algorithm used in the known fault phase,
which aims to satisfy the given speciﬁcation for maximizing system availability and performance. At each time instant k, it accepts the current operating state x(k) and returns
the best control action u∗ (k) (u∗ (k) = u1 (k) in Figure 3.5). Starting from this state, the
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Table 3.1
The Fault Recovery Control Algorithm
input: x(k), φ(k − 1, n), λ(k − 1, n), x(k − 1, n), u(k − 1, n), pf ,
H(x, k), I(x, k), N
s0 := x(k)
for i=0 to N-1 do
λ̂(k + i):=η(λ(k + i − 1, n))
λ(k + i, n):={λ̂(k + i)} ∪ λ(k + i − 1, n − 1)
si+1 :=∅
for all x ∈ si ∩ H(x, k),u ∈ U ∩ I(x, k) do
φ̂(k+i) := gf (φ(k+i−1, n), x(k+i−1, n), u(k+i−1, n), λ(k+
i − 1, n))
ˆ + i), φ(k
ˆ + i))
x̂(k + i + 1) := h(x(k + i), u(k + i), λ(k
si+1 := si+1 ∪ {x̂(k + i + 1)}
J(k + i) := pf JR (k + i) + (1 − pf )JP (k + i)
i
P
cost(x̂(k + i + 1)) :=
J(k + m)
m=0

end for
end for
xmin := arg min{cost(x)|x ∈ sN ∩ H(x, k + N )}
return u∗ := the ﬁrst control action from x(k) to xmin
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Figure 3.5
Predictive Control Process: Lookahead Search Tree

controller considers the constraint set H(x, k) and constructs in breadth-ﬁrst fashion, a tree
of all valid future states up to the speciﬁed prediction depth. The algorithm exhaustively
evaluates all states in the tree to determine the best control action corresponding to the
input constraint set I(x, k). Therefore, the size of the search tree grows exponentially with
the number of inputs. The algorithm works similarly in the other states with related cost
function and control action sets.

3.4.2.1

Feasibility Considerations

Given the limited exploration nature of the proposed predictive control approach, it is
important to analyze the feasibility at the design stage. A control algorithm is feasible
if it can drive the system, in ﬁnite time, from any initial state in the operating region to
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a neighborhood (within a given tolerance domain) of the desired region and maintain it
there. In general, the feasibility of the predictive control approach depends on the system
dynamics, its QoS speciﬁcation and underlying environment conditions.
We deﬁne the feasibility of the predictive control algorithm as the capability of driving
a faulty system from any initial state y0 ∈ Y to a neighborhood of the desired normal
state contained in the tolerance domain y ∗ ∈ D ⊂ Yn , and maintain the system within this
neighborhood, given the operation space Y and D. If a bounded neighborhood R ⊂ Yn
of y ∗ can be found such that the given recovery solution drives the system to it in ﬁnite
steps, and securely keeps any trajectories inside R from moving out, the feasibility can be
guaranteed. Unlike the traditional optimization problems, the desired state y ∗ in fault management is not a single point. Instead, it is a subregion Yn∗ ⊂ Yn whose size and position
comply with the current environment input characteristics λ. Without loss of generality,
we assume Yn∗ is a convex polytope and its ball center [72] (i.e., the center of the largest
ball inside a convex polytope) is considered as the desired state y ∗ . Also, we assume that
the environment input does not change signiﬁcantly during the fault management process,
so that y ∗ will at least stay invariant until the system is healed.
According to the theory for stability analysis in [79], the feasibility of the proposed
control algorithm can be guaranteed. Details of the formal proof can be found in Appendix
A.1.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, the proposed fault management structure is validated by injecting four
common faults to the testbeds, and executing the fault management process to enable autonomic fault recovery. The testbed setup and fault injecting methods are introduced. The
experiments on a centralized Web application testbed and a distributed big data processing
testbed are presented with results, which demonstrate that faults are efﬁciently managed.

4.1

Experiment Environment

4.1.1

Testbed Setup

Two testbeds have been designed to validate the proposed fault management structure:
a centralized testbed, and a distributed big data processing testbed.
The centralized testbed consists of four components: a Web application server, a client
simulator, a database server and a controller node which is shown in Figure 4.1. Xen Hypervisor is used with CentOS 5.8 as the virtualization platform. Each component of the
testbed is implemented on a virtual machine (VM), which has 1GB memory and one CPU
core. As an implementation of the fault management structure (Figure 3.1), the Web application server is the managed system where the faults are injected, while the controller and
diagnoser are instantiated on the controller node. The DVD Store application [51] is used
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as the benchmark software. The database is built with MySQL. The Ganglia monitoring
framework [84] is applied to collect system variables from all components to the controller
node. The client simulator sends requests (i.e., the workload) to the Web application server.
Httperf [48] by HP is used to generate requests as per the World Cup 98 historical data [8].
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Figure 4.1
The Centralized Web Application Testbed

The distributed testbed for big data processing has 15 virtual nodes as the slave nodes
(i.e., nodes serving as datanode and tasktracker), which possess the same virtualization, OS
and computing resource conﬁgurations as the virtual node has in the centralized testbed.
One physical node is set as the master node (i.e., the node serving as namenode and jobtracker), which is also the host of the virtual machines. Each of the slave nodes has both a
datanode and a tasktracker, while the master node hosts the namenode and the jobtracker.
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The fault management structure monitors system metrics from both the master node and
slave nodes. The complete testbed setup is shown in Figure 4.2. Hadoop 1.1.2 is installed
as the MapReduce solution.The PUMA MapReduce Benchmark [13] is used to generate
workload to the Hadoop cluster.
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Figure 4.2
The Distributed Testbed for Big Data Processing

4.1.2

Fault Injection

Memory leaks, network failures, CPU hog and disk failures are injected in the centralized testbed during experiments. The memory leak is injected by a Java process which occupies the heap memory without releasing its space. This process can bypass the garbage
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collector, and devour as many mega bytes from the available memory. The leak speed
(2MB/min, 6MB/min, and etc.) is set by a parameter passed to the process.
Netem [68] is a network emulation tool carried by most Linux distributions, which
can simulator a wide range of network failures including delay, loss, duplication and reordering. In this experiment, it is used as the network failure injection method. Three
failures were injected in the system, which are 100-millisecond delay, 30% package loss
and narrowed bandwidth (24kb/s).
The CPU Hog is injected by running the Super-Pi benchmark in background to exhaust
the CPU resource. The disk failures are simulated as a disk I/O bottleneck: a process that
reads/writes big bunches of data from/to the disk.

4.1.3

Cost Functions

The cost function J consists of system availability cost and performance cost as described in Section 3.4.1. In this dissertation, these cost functions are deﬁned based on the
underlying operating environment and system model. The unit of cost values is dollar for
all the cost functions.
The system availability cost function JR can be divided into three terms: kφ(k) − φn k,
kur (k)k and kΔur (k)k (Equation 3.8). The cost of fault impact kφ(k) − φn k is a function
of the minimum execution time per request s(k) and other time delay per request β(k). If
a fault exists, the system’s ability of processing requests will deteriorate in proportion to
the fault’s intensity. This effect can be measured by the change in the value of s(k) and
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β(k). The following equation deﬁnes the fault intensity cost, where s∗ and β ∗ are average
values under the normal condition, and 0.08 is the assumed cost.
kφ(k) − φn kA1 = 0.08

p
(s(k) − s∗ )2 + (β(k) − β ∗ )2

(4.1)

kur (k)kB1 and kΔur (k)kC1 are the cost of applying and changing recovery actions, respectively.
In this experiment, UR has three control actions for both known and unknown faults:
UR = {Do nothing,Restarting,Replica}

(4.2)

Thus, kur (k)kB1 + kΔur (k)kC1 is simpliﬁed as the cost of taking no actions, restarting the
node, and renting a new replica. The restarting cost is deﬁned as the SLA penalty for the
blackout period denoted by 0.1trs , where 0.1 is the assumed cost per second and trs is the
time duration of restarting. The cost of renting a new replica is denoted by 0.2trp , where
0.2 is the assumed cost per second and trp is replica usage time. The cost of taking no
actions is 0.
Similarly, the system performance cost function JP has three terms (Equation 3.9).
kx(k)−x∗ kA2 is performance degradation cost calculated by x(k). In our system, response
time r(k) is considered as the QoS factor in x(k). Thus, this term can be calculated by the
SLA price model in Figure 4.3.
As for the cost brought by performance tuning action, we ignore kΔup (k)kC2 since
changing such an action in our system has no negative effects. The term kup (k)kB2 evaluates the power consumption E ∈ R+ as per each uP (k) ∈ UP (i.e., CPU frequencies),
which is measured based on a power checklist created by enumerating the frequency from
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The SLA Price Model based on Response Time
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the minimum to the maximum, and the CPU usage from 0.2% to 100%. Given a CPU frequency and percentage usage, the power consumption can be calculated from the checklist.
For example, kup (k)kB2 = 0.03E(k) dollars where $0.03 is the assumed cost per watt.
The SLA penalties (i.e., the dollar values) in our system are assumed in a meaningful
way to test our methods. For other situations, these penalties can be conﬁgured with respect
to the underlying application.

4.1.4

Implementation of the Four-phase Control Process

The four-phase fault management process (Section 3.3) is applied to our experimental
system. The following parts of this subsection will introduce how the control approach is
implemented to solve a practical fault management problem.

4.1.4.1

Normal Phase

In this phase, the system composite state is identiﬁed within the predeﬁned normal
operation region ZN , which is based on the approach described in Section 3.3.1. During
simulations when the system is normal, system states, fault related parameters and various
workloads are recorded as the region ZN . Given the current z(k), the deviation δ(k) is
calculated online based on the dataset ZN .
δ(k) = min kz(k) − zk
z∈ZN

(4.3)

When δ(k) is greater than a threshold and it still holds after 30 seconds, the diagnoser will
recognize the system as in the detection state.
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4.1.4.2

Detection Phase

The state transitions in this phase are determined by the conditions described in Section
3.3.2. The diagnoser checks the composite system state z(k), calculates d(k), and identiﬁes
φ(k) at each sampling point. The fault parameter set Φd is built by ofﬂine parameter
estimation with incipient faults, such as a memory leak. If a fault diagnosis is triggered
when d(k) >  and φ(k) ∈
/ Φd , the Naive Bayesian Network (NBN) is applied to identify
the fault class.
NBN is a simpliﬁed version of the standard Bayesian network [52] that assumes the
independence of the attributes of a given class. Usually in an NBN classiﬁer [41], the unknown class (ex. the fault in this proposal) is placed at the parent node, while the attributes
which determine the class are child nodes.
Ai is deﬁned as one of the n attributes relating to the fault, c is the class of the fault,
P (·) is the probability of the given class or attribute and α is

Q

P (Ai ). According to the

i∈n

Bayes’ theorem and the independence between attributes,

P (c|A1 , A2 , . . . , An ) = αP (c)

Y

P (Ai |c)

(4.4)

i∈n

The probabilities of different faults’ attributes are compared and the one with the highest
probability is chosen as the result. The ﬁnite set of fault classes known by the system is
denoted by C. Accordingly, the fault class can be given by,

arg max P (c)

Y

c∈C

i∈n
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P (Ai |c)

(4.5)

Since all the attributes are continuous, the cumulative probability distribution functions
(CDF) of them is built up to ﬁgure out the probabilities P (Ai |c). Suppose the CDF for a
continuous random variable A is deﬁned by
Z

a

G(a) = P (A ≤ a) =

g(b)db

(4.6)

−∞

where g(b) is the probability density function. Usually CDF is calculated based on a density function that describes a known probability distribution and ﬁts the data well, such as
the normal distribution. In this proposal, the non-parametric kernel distribution is used to
create CDF. The CDF is pre-trained with the attribute data from the experiments where the
fault class is pre-determined and injected to the system.
The probability of the classes of faults is assumed as a priori. For example, a priori probabilities of the normal condition, memory leak and network fault can be denoted
by P (Normal), P (MemoryLeak), and P (NetworkFault), respectively. The predetermined probabilities will be adjusted on-the-ﬂy according to the current probability
status where k is the time point, and π is the adjusting factor. π = 0.05 is used during
experiments in this proposal.
Pk+1 (c0 ) = Pk (c0 ) + π , if c0 = arg max P (c)

Y

c∈C

Pk+1 (c0 ) = Pk (c0 ) − π , otherwise

P (Ai |c)

i∈n

(4.7)

Particularly, this classiﬁer can estimate the strength or level of a given fault (e.g., the memory leak speed) if it is trained under a series of levels of the fault (i.e., treat the different
levels as different classes).
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4.1.4.3

Known Fault Phase

In this phase, the controller applies the FRC algorithm in Table 3.1 according to the
estimated fault related parameters φ̂(k) in Equation 3.4 to select the most optimal fault
recovery solution. φ(k) in the system model is adjusted according to the parameter identiﬁcation. The request arrival rate λ̂(k) is estimated by the ARIMA predictor. Based on
λ̂(k), the system variables x̂(k + 1) can be predicted by the system model described in
Section 4.2.1. As a result, the entire future state is generated by the controller to facilitate
the FRC algorithm.
Given the assumption that there is only one fault in the system and the prediction horizon N = 2, a path can be created by estimating future system states x(k + 1), x(k + 2)
with the control inputs uR (k) = {restarting} and uR (k + 1) = {do nothing}.
The blackout period of restarting a VM is 192 seconds on average, while the 30-second
sampling interval is used in general. In this case, the cost of the path J(k) + J(k + 1) can
be calculated by the methods introduced in Section 4.1.3.

4.1.4.4

Unknown Fault Phase

When the diagnoser fails to identify a fault, conservative recovery actions will be selected from UU by the controller (Section 3.4.2). In this case study, the single action in UU
is to isolate the faulty node from the cluster with an alert sent to the system administrator,
and the faulty node will be replaced by a replica for service availability.
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4.2

Case Study
In this section, implementations of the fault management process in our work will

be introduced in detail. In the ﬁrst case study, a memory leak ,a network congestion, a
CPU hog and a disk failure were injected in the system in sequence. Full results will
demonstrate successful recovery from both of the faults. The overhead of the proposed
fault management approach is also analyzed in Case 1. In the second case study, fault
management of a distributed big data processing application (Hadoop) will be introduced.

4.2.1

The Centralized Testbed System Model

The system model for the centralized testbed is described in the following equations.
q̂(k + 1) = max{q(k) + T (λ̂(k) −
r̂(k + 1) = (1 + q(k))

α(k)
), 0}
s(k)

s(k)
β(k)
+
(q(k) + T λ̂(k))
α(k) α(k)

(4.8)

In Equation Group 4.8, q(k) denotes the current queue level, q̂(k + 1) is the queue level
estimation at the next sampling point, λ̂(k) denotes the estimated request arrival rate (per
second) during the next sampling period, α(k) is the ratio of the applied CPU frequency
to the maximum frequency, s(k) is the execution time (second) per request under the maximum frequency, and β(k) is the extra time spent on each request outside the processor
(e.g., network delay, database query, etc.). The term α(k)/s(k) quantiﬁes the number of
requests that the CPU can serve per second. r̂(k + 1) denotes the response time estimation
of the next sampling period. It represents how much time it spends to serve the requests
in the future queue, which reveals the fact that the estimated response time will increase if
the current queue level is high and the future load is heavy.
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Equation Group 4.8 is an instantiation of Equation 3.3. The system state x(k) consists of q(k) and r(k). The control action uP (k) is the CPU frequency α(k). As for the
recovery actions uR (k), three methods were used: doing nothing, restarting the server,
and replacing the faulty node with a replica. They are denoted as the set {no action,
restarting, replica}. The fault related parameters φ(k) is the minimum amount
of time to serve one request s(k) and other time delay on a request β(k).

4.2.2

Case 1: Various Faults in a Web Server

The experiment results of dealing with four types of faults are shown in Figure 4.4.
From top to bottom, the sub-ﬁgures illustrates the request arrival rate, the CPU frequency,
the memory usage, the queue level, the response time and the network throughput (”+”=
input, ”o”= output), respectively. The sampling interval between two adjacent data points
is 30 seconds. Nine milestone time points are labeled from 1 to 9. At Time 1, a 12MB/s
memory leak was injected to the system. Then the memory usage gradually increased. The
controller selected restarting as the recovery action at Time 2, which resulted in a blackout
period between Time 2 and 3. At Time 3, the system was completely recovered from the
fault. The network failure (30% packet loss) was injected at Time 4, which induced high
response time, high memory utilization and low network throughput. The controller healed
the system at Time 5 by redirecting the workload to the replica. At Time 6, a CPU hog was
injected, which led to relatively higher response time. A replica was used to recover the
system at Time 7. After the disk hog was injected at Time 8, the controller successfully
detected and removed the fault by using a replica at Time 9. During the entire one-hour
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experiment, the controller tuned the CPU frequencies according to the system status to
optimize the performance.
The performance of the fault management approach is also evaluated in terms of system
resource overhead. The ﬁrst experiment was conducted with the DVD store application
and the proposed control approach; and in the second experiment the control approach was
removed. In Figure 4.5, the CPU utilization, CPU load and memory usage of the whole
cluster are recorded for both experiments during one hour. Data points were sampled every
30 seconds. Green Bars (GB) represent metrics with the control approach, while black bars
(BB) are without it. The length of a bar reveals the metric value.
For CPU utilization (Figure 4.5A), the average BB value during one hour is 2.8, while
the average GB value is 4.3, which means that the proposed fault management approach
only adds 1.5% CPU utilization overhead on average to the system. In Figure 4.5B, the
average GB CPU load value is 0.24 higher than the BB value. Note that CPU load is a
metric that measures the CPU’s capability of handling processes, depending on the CPU
queue length. Since the testbed has 16 CPU cores, the saturated CPU load of our system
is 16. Our approach only brings 0.24/16 = 1.5% load overhead. As for the memory
usage (Figure 4.5C), the average GB value is even 6MB less than the BB value, showing
negligible memory overhead.

4.2.3

Case 2: Hadoop Fault Management

In this case study, the proposed fault management structure was applied to solve various
fault problems in a distributed big data processing system: the Hadoop cluster. Each node
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Figure 4.4
The Experiment Results of Solving Various Faults
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Figure 4.5
Performance Overhead of the Proposed Structure

in the cluster was monitored by the Ganglia framework and the fault status was reported for
each individual node. 3 out of the 15 slave nodes are conﬁgured as replica nodes that can
replace faulty nodes when necessary. This section will introduce the Hadoop performance
model, the model parameters used in this research, and experiment results.

4.2.3.1

Hadoop Performance Modeling

As introduced in Section 2.1.5, a Hadoop job is executed in two phases: Map and
Reduce, which consist of several sub-phases. These sub-phases are described in Table 4.1
and Table 4.2, respectively.
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Table 4.1
Sub-phases in a Map phase
Sub-phase
Description
Read
A slave node reads input data splits from HDFS and generates input key-value pairs (i.e., records).
Map
The user deﬁned map function is executed which emits intermediate output data.
Collect
The intermediate output data is partitioned and collected
into a buffer.
Spill
The in-buffer data is sorted and spilled to local disk. Compression and a combine function is used if speciﬁed.
Merge
Spilled ﬁles are merged into a single map output ﬁle.

Table 4.2
Sub-phases in a Reduce phase
Sub-phase
Shufﬂe
Merge
Reduce
Write

Description
Intermediate map output data is transferred to a reducer
node. Data is decompressed if necessary.
Also called ”sort” in literature. The sorted data output from
mappers is merged to feed the reduce function.
The reduce function is executed to generate ﬁnal output
data.
Final output data is written to HDFS. Compressing is used
if speciﬁed.
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The FRC algorithm (Section 3.4.2) relies on the prediction of future system states to
create a search tree, which is used for selecting a recovery plan with minimum cost. In
order to manage faults in Hadoop with the proposed approach, it is required to predict
Hadoop system states. Thus, the modeling of Hadoop performance is critical for calculating total job execution cost based on a job’s features. When a job is submitted to Hadoop,
its feature can be monitored from per-job and per-task counters which are usually stored
at the master node. In this research, the key job execution cost calculated from the model
is the execution time. Herodotou has provided a detailed analytical anatomy of Hadoop
performance modeling [47]. Based on his work, the model is modiﬁed to ﬁt the conﬁguration of our Hadoop cluster. Details of the Hadoop performance modeling can be found
in Appendix B.1. The input to the modiﬁed Hadoop performance model can be found in
Table Table 4.3, while the output of this model is the job execution time totalJobT ime.
Table 4.3
Hadoop Performance Model Input
Model Input
mSplitSize
mM apInputRecords
mN umN odes
mN umM appers

Description
The size of a data split sent to a mapper.
The number of records in a data split.
The number of nodes in a cluster.
The number of map tasks.
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4.2.3.2

Implementation of the Fault Management Structure

The centralized Web service system and distributed big data processing systems have
different characteristics. Therefore, the formal system model (Equation 3.3) is implemented in a way different from that in Case Study 1. Since the namenode is a single point
of failure in Hadoop v1.1.2 deployed in this case study [18], we did not consider faults
in the master node. Rather, the aim of this case study is to verify the fault management
framework on solving fault problems in slave nodes.
Recall that the system model has the following form:

x(k + 1) = h(x(k), u(k), λ(k), φ(k))

(4.9)

According to the Hadoop performance model, the system state variables x(k) include values in Table 4.3. The output of the model is also determined by system wide Hadoop
conﬁguration parameters in Table 4.4, which can be preset to overwrite default values
when initialing a new job and they are not impacted by faults. However, in this experiment
these parameter values are ﬁxed as shown in Table 4.4. The performance related parameter is the job execution time. The environment input rate λ is not used in this case study:
the Hadoop performance model utilized in this dissertation does not consider concurrent
job executions. All jobs entered the Hadoop cluster individually in sequence. The controller predicts future system states by the model inputs, fault related parameters, Hadoop
conﬁguration parameters and current status of the job.
Recall that the fault model (Equation 3.4) has the following form:

φ(k + 1) = gf (φ(k), x(k), λ(k), u(k))
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(4.10)

Table 4.4
System Wide Hadoop Conﬁguration Parameters
Parameter Name Alias Value
pSortRecP erc
0.05
pSortM B
200
pSpillP erc
0.8
pSortF actor
20
pN umReducers
1
pT askM em
400
pShuf f leBuf P erc
0.7
pShuf f leM ergeP erc
0.66
pInM emM ergeT hr
1000
pM apSlotsP ernode
1
pReduceSlotsP ernode
1

Faults will impact the Hadoop performance model parameters in Table 4.5. Thus, these are
considered as fault related parameters in this case study. The values of φ(k) given a speciﬁc
fault can be calculated when a single node has the fault injected under various workloads.
The fault impacts on φ(k) when there are multiple nodes with faults can be estimated by
ofﬂine training: inject the same fault to various numbers of nodes and monitor the change
of φ(k). For instance, network failures can be injected to one node, 4 nodes, 8 nodes and
12 nodes at each time. An analytical fault related parameter estimation function has been
developed for supporting the online fault recovery for Hadoop clusters. Suppose a cluster
has n slave nodes in total, and there are m nodes that has fault type f , then φ(k) can be
estimated by the following function:
φf m (k) =

m
(φf n (k) − φf 1 (k)) + φf 1 (k)
n
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(4.11)

In function 4.11, φf m (k) denotes the fault related parameters when there are m nodes under
fault f . φf n (k) represents the parameter value when all n nodes are under the fault f , and
φf 1 (k) is the value when only one node has the same fault. Both values are measured at
the ofﬂine training stage.
Table 4.5
Fault Related Parameters in the System Model
Parameter Name
sCP U cost
sHdf sReadCost
sHdf sW riteCost
sLocalDiskReadCost
sLocalDiskW riteCost
sN etworkCost

Description
The time of processing each map-reduce record
The time of reading a data split from HDFS
The time of writing a data split to HDFS
The time of reading one MB data from the local hard disk
The time of writing one MB data to the local hard disk
The time of transmitting one MB data in the network

Table 4.6 shows the average normal values of the fault related parameters. To verify
Equation 4.11, a series of experiments have been made to check φ values when there are
many anomaly nodes for each fault type. Table 4.7 reveals the fault related parameters
when multiple nodes have network failures. If a parameter is not impacted by a given fault,
its table will not appear under the fault. Network failures has little impacts on the local
disk read and write rate. Table 4.8 describes the fault related parameters under memory
leak, which does not include the CPU time and network throughput. Table 4.9 shows the
fault related parameters under CPU hog: it does not affect the local disk read and write
rate.
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Table 4.6
Normal Values of Fault Related Parameters
Parameter Name
Value
CPU Time to Process a Record
0.0342ms
HDFS Read Rate
5.48MB/s
HDFS Write Rate
2.17MB/s
Local Disk Read Rate
1482.99MB/s
Local Disk Write Rate
560.64MB/s
Network Throughput
48.52MB/s

Table 4.7
Fault Related Parameters Impacted by Network Failures
Number of Faulty Nodes
4
HDFS Read Rate (MB/s)
4.82
HDFS Write Rate (MB/s)
2.13
CPU Time to Process a Record (ms) 0.0349
Network Throughput (MB/s)
1.838

6
4.77
2.05
0.0479
1.63

8
3.89
1.97
0.0495
1.24

10
3.27
1.90
0.0572
0.61

Table 4.8
Fault Related Parameters Impacted by Memory Leak
Number of Faulty Nodes
HDFS Read Rate (MB/s)
HDFS Read Rate (MB/s)
Local Disk Read Rate (MB/s)
Local Disk Write Rate (MB/s)
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2
3.76
1.82
1225.08
473.96

4
3.23
1.71
1050.93
377.60

8
2.68
1.50
640.03
194.23

12
3.05
1.78
0.0629
0.08

Table 4.9
Fault Related Parameters Impacted by CPU Hog
Number of Faulty Nodes
HDFS Read Rate (MB/s)
HDFS Write Rate (MB/s)
Network Throughput (MB/s)
CPU Time to Process a Record (ms)

4.2.3.3

1
3.79
1.86
2.70
0.0397

4
3.38
1.8
1.86
0.0406

8
2.74
1.42
1.45
0.0428

12
2.42
1.01
1.09
0.0467

Experiment Results

In this experiment, the PUMA benchmark was used to generate two types of workload:
terasort and wordcount. The terasort benchmark utilizes the MapReduce framework to sort
key-value pairs in 3GB data ﬁle. On the other hand, the wordcount benchmark enumerates
all words in a text ﬁle and counts the number of each one. It used datasets from Wikipedia
that contain three sizes of text ﬁles: 256MB, 512MB and 1GB. Terasort and wordcount
jobs were submitted to the Hadoop cluster in a random sequence. There was no concurrent
job submission: each individual job was submitted only after the previous one was done.
The experiment results of dealing with four types of faults in a slave node are shown
in Figure 4.7. From top to bottom, the sub-ﬁgures shows the CPU load, the network
throughput (”+”= bytes input, ”o”= bytes output), the memory usage, page in and out
rate (”+”= in, ”o”= out), and the hard disk reads and writes (”+”= reads, ”o”= writes),
respectively. The sampling interval between two adjacent data points is 30 seconds. Nine
milestone time points are labeled from 1 to 9. At Time 1, a CPU hog was injected to the
system. The controller selected to use a replica to recover the cluster at Time 2. At Time
3, a disk failure was injected. The controller still used the replica recovery action due to
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the severity of the fault, which healed the system at Time 4. At Time 5, a 6MB/s memory
leak was injected. The controller reacted at Time 6 when restarted the system. After
a node blackout period, the system was recovered at Time 7. Time 8 and 9 illustrate the
injection of a 30% packet loss network failure and the recovery with a replica, respectively.
Figure 4.6 shows the zoom-in view of the network throughput from time point 80 to 113.

Figure 4.6
The Zoom-in View of Network Throughput for Hadoop Fault Recovery Experiments
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Figure 4.7
The Experiment Results of Solving Various Faults in a Hadoop Slave Node
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CHAPTER 5
A COMPONENT-BASED MODELING ENVIRONMENT

In practical applications, domain engineers may not have sufﬁcient expertise in system
modeling and control algorithm design. A component-based modeling environment will be
developed for this research which can facilitate domain engineers to conveniently apply the
proposed fault management structure on their computing systems. Those domain speciﬁc
models are built upon the pre-accomplished meta-models, which are high-level abstractions of the structure. Thus the domain engineers do not need to obtain the knowledge in
system modeling and controller design. For example, a database server maintenance engineer can use the meta-models to design a fault tolerance application for the speciﬁc system
without knowing how the fault tolerance is fulﬁlled. In this chapter, the tool used for developing the component-based modeling environment and the work on meta-modeling will
be introduced.

5.1

Generic Modeling Environment
The Generic Modeling Environment (GME) [50] is used to design the fault tolerance

component-based modeling environment. GME is a graphical Model Integrated Computing (MIC) [81] tool-kit based on Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) [85]. Similar to the
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two-level development process of MIC, a GME modeling workﬂow usually includes the
following phases:
1. Meta-model Development: The meta-models abstract the high-level properties of
a domain speciﬁc system, including basic system components, their connectivity,
attributes, and constraints.
2. Application Model Development: Domain engineers use the meta-models to design their applications in a graphical environment. The only knowledge required
for engineers is the occurrence of system components, their connections and related
attributes.

GME also has Component Object Model interfaces to many mainstream high-level programming languages, such as C++. Visual Basic, C# and Python, which allow the users to
generate domain speciﬁc codes and external components. It has been successfully applied
in areas such as performance management [10], system and software health management
[11], and failure diagnosis by timed failure propagation graphs [12].

5.2

Meta-model Development
The meta-model development follows the system structure as illustrated in Figure 3.1.

Meta-models usually contain internal structures such as sub-models (i.e., nested metamodels) and the simplest objects without any internal structures, which are deﬁned as
atoms in GME. Atoms have their attributes to represent the related entities in its parent
meta-model. All components of the system structure are described by the associated metamodels, which will be discussed in this section.
The Architecture meta-model (Figure 5.1) is the top level abstract model which consists
of all the modules and connections between them. It represents the big picture of the proposed fault management system. For example, the Environment module corresponds to the
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external environment, the Datalink represents connections in the system, the SystemModel
is the mathematical model of the physical system, etc.

Figure 5.1
The Architecture Meta-model

The SystemModel meta-model (Figure 5.2) is the mathematical representation of the
system, which is used by the controller for performance and fault management. Major
components in this meta-model include the Function model, Control Input model, System
State model, Variable model, and Hybrid Automata model. The Function model deﬁnes
the state transition function of the system, which calculates the outputs with respect to
the inputs. The Control Input is an atom that stands for the control input value triggering
the actuator. The system state variables and fault related parameters of the system model
are represented by the System State model and Variable model, respectively. The Hybrid
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Automata relates to the behavior of the hybrid switching system, which is a ﬁnite state
machine driving the proposed four-state control process.

Figure 5.2
The System Model Meta-model

The Environment meta-model (Figure 5.3) deﬁnes the environment that interacts with
the managed system. It incorporates an Environment model which can be connected to
sensors in a physical system and an Environment sim model which is used for ofﬂine simulation before it is applied for production. In a simulation, the environment input can either
be gathered by the Reader atom from an existing data set, or be generated by a software
represented by the Generator atom.
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Figure 5.3
The Environment Meta-model

The Classiﬁer meta-model (Figure 5.4) is a module which deﬁnes the fault diagnosis
algorithms. In a domain speciﬁc application, engineers can use this module to build classiﬁers according to their project speciﬁcations. In this meta-model, the Function sub-model
carries the mathematical formulas, usually machine learning methods, for fault diagnosis.
The Physical System meta-model (Figure 5.5) reﬂects the components in a typical physical system that the fault management structure works on. Besides the necessary data connections (e.g., Data Link, FSM Conn Out and FSM Conn In), the major objects in the
internal structure are Sensors, Actuators, and Physical System sim. This meta-model is
designed for helping domain engineers prepare a software implementation of their speciﬁc
systems. Sensors and Actuators deﬁne the metric monitors and software control knobs,
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Figure 5.4
The Classiﬁer Meta-model

respectively. Physical System sim sub-model is a sandbox which simulates the behavior of
a real system.
The Controller meta-model (Figure 5.6) formulates the structure of the fault management controller and all included elements that support the control process. The Input and
Output are the date transferred to the controller and selected control actions, respectively.
A ControllInputSet contains all possible performance tuning and fault recovery control actions, modeled by Element, that can be used by the controller. The Function sub-model
is used here to generate mathematical representations utilized by the predictive control
algorithm. The cost functions are deﬁned in the Utility sub-model with constraints and
predeﬁned Constant.
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Figure 5.5
The Physical System Meta-model
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Figure 5.6
The Controller Meta-model
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5.3

Application Model Development
An example of the application model created for the centralized Web server case study

in Section 4.2.2 is illustrated in Figure 5.7. The graphical environment in the second level
of MIC allows engineers to design speciﬁc systems that meet domain engineering standards. The user-friendly application models Environment, Physical System, Fault Management Controller and Fault Diagnoser are implementations of their related meta-models.
Also, the connection constraints follow the original design in the meta-model which regulates the connection direction and availability between the application models. In this
example, the environment sends user request to the physical system, which is the Web
application server. The fault management controller and fault diagnoser cooperate to optimize performance and recover the system from incoming faults. The entire application
model can be used as a pre-implementation simulation platform to validate the proposed
control algorithm and fault diagnosis methods. The codes for ofﬂine simulation or online
production can be generated by the high-level component interface embedded in GME.
The process of analyzing GME application models can generate useful information
such as the structure of a model, conﬁgurations of each component, and values of constants. This process is referred as model interpretation in this dissertation, which is essential to enable simulations and even code generations from the application model. GME
provides C++ interfaces to let users access and modify application models (e.g., attributes
and connectivity). Speciﬁcally, the Builder Object Network (BON) [3] is applied as an implementation of C++ interfaces (i.e., a C++ project with multiple source and header ﬁles).
It will be created when a user initiates model interpretation. Each component of the appli75

Figure 5.7
The Domain Speciﬁc Application Model of a Fault Management System

cation model (e.g., models, atoms, connections, etc.) will be mapped to a C++ object in
the BON. After it is successfully compiled, a model interpreter button will appear at the
GUI of the application model. In this dissertation, BON 2.0 is used, which has the typical
code structure as shown in Figure 5.8.
The major source ﬁle that is modiﬁed for interpretation is BON2Component.cpp.
When the model interpreter button is clicked in the application model GUI, the function
Component::invokeEx() will be executed. A glance of this function can be found
in Figure 5.9.
If it is only for simulation, the initial values of constants and variables are deﬁned at the
beginning of this function. Moreover, the component attributes in the application model
will also be extracted into the BON by traversing the entire application model. When it is
the online production situation, domain engineers are required to set all necessary attributes
in GME without access the BON codes. Figure 5.10 illustrates the code for traversing cost
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Figure 5.8
The Code Structure of BON 2.0
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Figure 5.9
A Glance at The Component::invodeEx() Function
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values associated with the recovery method “restart” in the Component::invodeEx()
function.

Figure 5.10
Traversing the Application Model in Component::invodeEx() Function

The model interpreter will generate C++ codes for the proposed fault management
approach after the structure of the application model is discovered and all attributes are
gathered (Figure 5.11). The codes can be executed on the testbed which was used in the
case study (Section 4.2.2) for online fault management as per the guidance of the application model. Since the testbed has the same conﬁguration as it is in Section 4.2.2, the
fault management structure executable generated by GME has the same function as well.
Therefore, the experiment results can refer to Figure 4.4 in Section 4.2.2.
On the other hand, the Component::invodeEx() function can be written as a
simulator. By interpreting the application model, users can get the simulation results. To
sum up, application model interpretation reduces the coding workload of domain engineers
and separates them from the expert knowledge behind the fault diagnosis and management
processes.
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Figure 5.11
A Part of C++ Codes Generated by the Model Interpreter
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

6.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, a model-based autonomic fault management approach for enterprise computing systems was developed. It can be applied to a wide range of centralized
and distributed computing systems including servers hosting Web applications and big
data processing systems. To create such a fault management approach, the following steps
should be taken:
1. Develop the performance model of the managed computing system.
2. Install a monitoring framework to gather system metrics from all computing nodes.
3. Pick fault detection methods that are effective for the targeted faults underlying the
managed system.
4. Conﬁgure the weighted cost functions to adjust the tradeoff between performance
degradation and penalties induced by fault recovery actions.
5. Apply the four-stage control approach along with the environment input estimation
method to enable autonomous fault recovery for the system.

This dissertation presents a systematic method for resolving the fault management issues in generic computing systems. The system model is deﬁned with the consideration
of potential fault impacts that manipulate the model parameters. With the help of the system model, the controller can estimate future system state and apply the predictive control
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algorithm to select the control action with minimum cost. In the normal situation, the controller optimizes system performance and keeps monitoring the fault related metrics. When
a fault is detected, the control action will be selected based on the known fault class and
fault intensity, which recovers the system while minimizes performance degradation. The
proposed method has been veriﬁed on a Web application testbed and a Hadoop big data
processing testbed. The feasibility of the control algorithm is also guaranteed as proven in
Appendix A.1.
A component-based modeling environment is designed by using model integrated computing (MIC) methodologies. The Generic Modeling Environment (GME), a MIC tool, is
applied to develop components of the fault management structure. The reusable components are implemented by meta-models in GME, which can be used to create application
models for domain projects. Engineers can conﬁgure each component in the fault management structure with regard to their speciﬁc application requirements and generate code
templates that can be easily ported to the computing system.

6.2

Future Research
This dissertation introduces a holistic fault management approach that covers all stages

including detection, identiﬁcation and recovery. It was demonstrated on a Web application
testbed and a Hadoop testbed. However, the contributions of this dissertation can lead to
future research opportunities as follows:

82

6.2.1

Extended Fault Detection Library

In this dissertation, the fault detection method is designed according to the applications
and general faults that may occur. However, it is hardly possible that a single fault detection
method can deal with all faults in any kind of computing systems. It depends on the
physical nature of the systems, the application deployment, the network topology, etc.
Therefore, the fault detection library can be extended to cover a larger set of computing
systems for identifying major faults in them.

6.2.2

Online Self-learning Fault Detection

We applied supervised learning as the fault detection method in all experiments throughout this dissertation. This technique requires that the fault patterns and fault impacts on
the system model parameters are studied ofﬂine before the management structure is deployed to a real system. The effectiveness of this supervised method is limited by the
range of known faults that can be simulated ofﬂine, the accuracy of the system model and
the amount of data used for training. Unsupervised machine learning methods can be applied as an extension of the proposed fault detection method, which can improve itself
online whenever a fault occurs in the system. This mechanism has two folds: ﬁrst, it reinforces the supervised detector by adding data points to the training set, which can improve
detection accuracy; second, it can identify fault impacts on the system rather than reporting
the exact type of a fault. Therefore, it can deal with unknown faults with dedicated control
actions that remove the particular fault effects on observable system metrics and reduce
related performance and availability cost.
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6.2.3

Extended for Security Management

The proposed fault management approach can also be extended for security management. Parameters in the system model which are impacted by security threats can be
identiﬁed. In this case, intrusions are considered as another type of “fault” in the context
of this dissertation. By incorporating intrusion detection methods, the security issues can
be solved by the four phases introduced in Section 3.3 and a predictive controller.
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APPENDIX A
FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICTIVE CONTROL ALGORITHM
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A.1

Formal Proof of the Feasibility Guarantee
According to [79], the feasibility problem is formally decomposed into two sub-

problems:
1. Containability problem: Determine the existence of a compact subset R ⊂ D such
that (∀y ∈ R)ĥ(y, u∗ , λ) ∈ R. The compact set R is said to be a containable region
under control policy u∗ .
2. Attraction problem: Find out a containable region in D is ﬁnitely reachable from any
initial state y0 outside the containable region under the given recovery solution.

Consider the new system model:

y(k + 1) = ĥ(y(k), u(k), λ(k))

(A.1)

It is assumed that the map ĥ : Y × U × Λ → Y is differentiable on the interior point of
Y × Λ and continuous on the closure of Y × Λ when u is ﬁxed. Also, suppose λ(k) =
[λ1 (k), λ2 (k), , λm (k)] ∈ Λ is the fault-related parameter vector with each λi (k)(1 ≤ i ≤
m) belonging to a ﬁnite closed interval λi = [λai , λbi ] ⊂ R. Without loss of generality,
suppose the origin is the desirable state y ∗ . The control objective is to minimize kyk. The
one-step-FRC is deﬁned as follows: for each y ∈ Y , select u∗ such that


∗



u ∈ arg min max kĥ(y, u, λ)k
u∈U

λ∈Λ

(A.2)

For each u ∈ U , let

Wu :=


y ∈ Y max kĥ(y, u, λ)k < kyk
λ∈Λ
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(A.3)

and Q :=

S

u∈U

Wu , which is the set of all states in Y where there is a recovery action u

that can drive the system closer to the desired state (i.e., the origin), regardless the value of
λ. Let Q = Y − Q, which is deﬁned as follows:
n
o
Q := y ∈ Y (∀u ∈ U )(∃λu ∈ Λ)kyk ≤ kĥ(y, u, λu )k

(A.4)

Since Y is compact and Q is open, Q is compact. Let
r∗ := max min max kĥ(y, u, φ)k
y∈Q u∈U λ∈Λ

(A.5)

Clearly, all related sets are compact and ĥ is differentiable, therefore r∗ is ﬁnite. The
containability of FRC is guaranteed by the following proposition.
Proposition 1
[79] The closed ball B(r∗ ) is a containable region.
Proof: For each y ∈ B(r∗ ), if y ∈ Q, we get the following inequality as per the deﬁnition
of Q
ˆ u∗ , λ)k < kyk ≤ r∗
kh(y,

(A.6)

If y ∈ Q, by Equation A.5 we have
max
kĥ(y, u0 , λ0 )k ≤ max min
max
kĥ(y 0 , u0 , λ0 )k = r∗
kĥ(y, u∗ , λ)k ≤ min
0
0
0
0
u ∈U λ ∈Λ

y 0 ∈Q u ∈U λ ∈Λ

(A.7)

So for any y ∈ Y , ĥ(y, u∗ , λ) ∈ B(r∗ ). In other words, there exists a recovery action u∗R
that can maintain system states within the normal space. The containability is guaranteed.
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However, it is usually very complicated to compute r∗ . To simplify the problem, the
following value is computed alternatively:
r∗ := min max max kĥ(y, u, λ)k
u∈U y∈Q λ∈Λ

(A.8)

According to the following proposition,
Proposition 2
[79] If ∂B(r∗ ) ⊆ Q then B(r∗ ) is ﬁnitely reachable under the given control policy.
The attraction problem can be solve by Proposition 3, where
n
o
∂B(r∗ ) := y ∈ B(r∗ ) kyk = r∗

(A.9)

Proposition 3
If u∗ is the control action, then B(r∗ ) is ﬁnitely reachable.
Proof: Suppose when u∗ is the fault recovery action, there exists a state yB in ∂B(r∗ )
that belongs to Q, i.e., ∂B(r∗ ) ∪ Q = {yB }. According to Equation A.4, there is a
λB such that kĥ(yB , u∗ , λB )k ≥ kyB k. According to Formula A.2, kĥ(yB , u∗ , λB )k ≤
max max
kĥ(y, u0 , λ0 )k = kyB k. A conﬂict occurs where
min max kĥ(yB , u, λ)k < min
0
0
u∈U λ∈Λ

u ∈U y∈Q λ ∈Λ

kyB k < kyB k. Therefore, ∂B(r∗ ) ∪ Q = ∅, i.e., ∂B(r∗ ) ⊆ Q. The attraction problem is
solved.
Given the above proofs, the feasibility of the control algorithm can be evaluated for a
given system, set of failures and operating conditions.
As an illustration, consider a simple queuing model shown in Figure A.1. Users send
requests to the server with the rate λ(k) at time point k. A queue holds user requests
d1 , d2 , ...dn with a total queue level q(k). The minimum time that the processing unit
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processes one request at the maximum CPU frequency is s(k), which is the fault related
parameter φ(k) in Equation 3.3. p(k) denotes the response time. A fault f is injected to
the server. u(k) denotes the control input that adjusts the CPU frequency α(k) and takes
recovery actions β(k) when there is a fault. In this simulation a memory leak is injected
which gradually increases memory usage m(k) until it reaches the maximum size (e.g.,
2GB). s(k) is adjusted linearly with m(k), which represents the fault impact on the system
model. Given the sampling interval T , the system dynamics is described as follows:
JU (u(k)) = α2 (k) + 2β(k)
u(k) = (α(k), β(k))
y(k) = [p(k) s(k) JU (u(k))]T
q(k + 1) = max{q(k) + T (λ(k) − α(k)/s(k)), 0}
p(k + 1) = (1 + q(k + 1))s(k)/α(k)
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ max(m(k) + 2, 2000) , if β(k) = 0
m(k + 1) =
⎪
⎪
⎩ 200 , if β(k) = 1
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ 0.0367(1 + max(m(k) − 200, 0)/200) , if β(k) = 0
s(k) =
⎪
⎪
⎩ 0.0367 , if β(k) = 1

(A.10)

The working set is
Y = {(p, s, JU ) ∈ R3 |0 ≤ p ≤ 30, 0.0367 ≤ s ≤ 0.367, 0 ≤ JU ≤ 3}

(A.11)

The desired region is
D = {(p, s, JU ) ∈ Y |0 < p < 15, 0 < s < 0.2, 0 < JU ≤ 3}
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(A.12)
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Figure A.1
A Simple Queuing Model with Injected Faults

The desired state is y ∗ = (0.1, 0.0367, 0.04). r∗ and r̂ are computed by nonlinear programming with the control input set
U = {u1 = (0.6, 0), u2 = (1, 0), u3 = (0.6, 1), u4 = (1, 1)}

(A.13)

In the test, we set λ = 300. The symbolic solver in MATLAB is used to plot the region
of Q by computing the boundaries,
Boundary 1: kĥ(y, u1 , λ) − y ∗ k = ky − y ∗ k
Boundary 2: kĥ(y, u2 , λ) − y ∗ k = ky − y ∗ k
Boundary 3: kĥ(y, u3 , λ) − y ∗ k = ky − y ∗ k
Boundary 4: kĥ(y, u4 , λ) − y ∗ k = ky − y ∗ k
Boundary 5: 0 ≤ p ≤ 30
Boundary 6: 0.0367 ≤ s ≤ 0.367
Boundary 7: 0 ≤ JU ≤ 3
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(A.14)

x1: Response Time

Top Surfaces

Bottom Surfaces

Set Point [0.0367 0.04 0.1]

Figure A.2
The region Q with λ = 300
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Figure A.2 depicts the region Q deﬁned by these boundaries, which is the space between the top surfaces and bottom surfaces. Let r̂ = max ky − y ∗ k. The nonlinear proy∈Q

gramming toolbox in MATLAB is used to compute r∗ and r̂. The initial pick for iteration
is x0 = (0.1, 0.05, 1). It turns out that r∗ = 11.75 and r̂ = 11.59. Suppose B(r∗ , y ∗ ) is the
closed ball centered at y ∗ with radius r∗ . By Proposition 1, it is a containable region. Since
r∗ > r̂, it is obvious that ∂B(r∗ , y ∗ ) ⊆ Q, which means B(r∗ , y ∗ ) is also ﬁnitely reachable
from Y by Proposition 2. Figure A.3 shows the memory leak simulation results with 2000

x1: Response Time

states, which are bounded close to y ∗ within the desired region D.

Figure A.3
Simulation Results with λ = 300

99

APPENDIX B
PERFORMANCE MODELING FOR THE HADOOP CLUSTER
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B.1

The Hadoop Performance Model
To modify the Hadoop performance model initially introduced in [47], we assume the

following facts for the cluster:
1. All the data processed by Hadoop is uncompressed.
2. CPU time related to all map and reduce processes (e.g., sort, merge, partition, and
etc.) is identical.
3. The number of reducers involved in a MapReduce job is more than 0.

Assumption 1 is made due to the limited system resources in the virtual environment
of the testbed. Compressing and decompressing processes can easily push the system to
the performance bottleneck. Assumption 2 is based on the fact from simulations that CPU
time of different map-reduce actions is very similar to each other. A single average value of
CPU time substitutes for all possible ﬁelds of CPU time in the Hadoop model. Assumption
3 is because all the benchmark jobs used in this research have reduce tasks.
In the context of the performance model, lower-case preﬁxes before terms in the equations indicate their origins. Generally the terms can be categorized into three groups (Table
Table B.1). bc represents the ﬂoor function (i.e., the largest integer not greater than a real
number), and de means the ceiling function (i.e., the smallest integer not less than a real
number). The rest of this section will describe the Hadoop performance model in details,
which is a modiﬁed version of the work in [47] based on the three assumptions.
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Table B.1
Preﬁxes of Equation Terms
Preﬁx
map
re
m
p
c
s
calc

B.1.1
B.1.1.1

Origin Description
Time cost in the Map phase
Time cost in the Reduce phase
Measured by monitoring tools
System wide Hadoop conﬁguration parameter
Calculated by other terms
Estimated from simulations
Methods that can be used in multiple scenarios

Map Phase
Read

In this sub-phase, a mapper reads a data split from HDFS. The cost of this sub-phase
is:
mapReadT ime = mSplitSize × sHdf sReadCost

B.1.1.2

(B.1)

Map

Key-value pairs (i.e., records) are created to be used by map functions as input. The
map input data size is determined by the input split size.
cM apInputBytes = mSplitSize

(B.2)

The cost of this sub-phase is:
mapM apT ime = mM apInputRecords × sCP U Cost

(B.3)

Note that the average CPU cost sCP U Cost is used as Map CPU cost, as discussed in the
previous assumptions.
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B.1.1.3

Collect

Output of map functions is also in the form of records, which are serialized and stored
in the memory buffer on a mapper node. They are partitioned into parts according to the
number of reducers determined by mapred.reduce.tasks (pN umReducers). The
size of the buffer is determined by the Hadoop parameter io.sort.mb (pSortM B). The
size of output data is calculated as follows:

cM apOutputBytes = cM apInputBytes

(B.4)

cM apOutputRecords = mM apInputRecords

(B.5)

cM apOutRecordsW idth =

cM apOutputBytes
cM apOutputRecords

(B.6)

The cost of Collect sub-phase consists of cost induced by partitioning each record, and
cost of serializing/de-serializing per record. As a result, sCP U Cost is used twice.
mapCollectT ime = 2 × cM apOutputRecords × sCP U Cost

B.1.1.4

(B.7)

Spill

The memory buffer has two isolated areas: the serialized area and accounting area,
to store serialized map output and 16 bytes metadata for each output record, respectively. The percentage of the memory buffer used by the accounting area is deﬁned by
io.sort.record.percent (pSortRecP erc). When the serialized area ﬁlled up to
the percentage threshold determined by io.sort.spill.percent (pSpillP erc), or
the accounting area is 100% full, the mapper will dump all data in the buffer to the hard
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disk. Before a spill, records in each of the partitions are sorted by keys. The maximum
number of records in the serialized area is:
cM axSerRecs =bpSortM B × 220 × (1 − pSortRecP erc)
(B.8)
× pSpillP erc/cM apOutRecordsW idthc
The maximum records in the accounting area is:
cM axAccRecs =

b pSortM B × 2

20

× pSortRecP erc
16

c

(B.9)

The number of records to be spilled is:
cSpillBuf f erRecords =
M in{cM axSerRecs, cM axAccRecs, cM apOutputRecords}
(B.10)
The spilled buffer size is:
cSpillBuf f erSize = cSpillBuf f erRecords × cM apOutRecordsW idth

(B.11)

The total number of spills is:
cN umSpills =

cM apOutRecords
d cSpillBuf
e
f erRecords

(B.12)

Since Hadoop applies Quick Sort as the sorting method, the average time complexity is
expected as O(nlogn), where n refers to the number of records in each partition. Hence,
the cost of Spill Sub-phase is:
mapSpillT ime = cN umSpills×
[cSpillBuf f erRecords × log2 (

cSpillBuf f erRecords
) × sCP U Cost
pN umReducers

+ cSpillBuf f erSize × sLocalDiskW riteCost]
(B.13)
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B.1.1.5

Merge

In the merge sub-phase, if there are more than one spill ﬁle, they are merged into a
single output ﬁle, which is written to the local disk. The maximum number of spills that
can be merged into one ﬁle is determined by the Hadoop parameter io.sort.factor
(pSortF actor). A merge pass is deﬁned as the merging of at most pSortF actor spill ﬁles.
Multiple merge passes are required if the number of spill ﬁles (cN umSpills) is greater than
pSortF actor. In this case, Hadoop is designed to merge exactly pSortF actor spills in the
ﬁnal pass. For instance, when cN umSpills = 11 and pSortF actor = 10, the ﬁrst pass
will merge 2 spills which creates one new spill ﬁle. Then in the second and ﬁnal pass, the
remaining 9 spills and the new spill will be merged. To this end, the merge sub-phase is
divided into the ﬁrst pass, intermediate merging (including the ﬁrst pass), and the ﬁnal pass.
Since in the Reduce Phase merging works in a similar way, the following three methods
are deﬁned to be reused in both merge sub-phases.
calcN umSpillsF irstP ass(N, F ) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
N
, if N ≤ F
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
F
, if (N − 1) MOD (F − 1) = 0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ (N − 1) MOD (F − 1) + 1 , otherwise
calcN umSpillsIntermM erge(N, F ) = P + b

N −P
c×F
F

, where P = calcN umSpillsF irstP ass(N, F )
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(B.14)

(B.15)

calcN umSpillsF inalP ass(N, F ) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ 0

, if N ≤ F

⎪
⎪
⎩ 1 + b N −P c + (N − S) , otherwise
F

(B.16)

, where P = calcN umSpillsF irstP ass(N, F )
, and S = calcN umSpillsIntermM erge(N, F )
The number of spills merged before the ﬁnal pass is:
cN umSpillsIntermM erge =
(B.17)
calcN umSpillsIntermM erge(cN umSpills, pSortF actor)
The ﬁnal size and number of records for the ﬁnal map output data are:
cIntermDataSize = cN umSpills × cSpillBuf f erSize

(B.18)

cIntermDataRecords = cN umSpills × cSpillBuf f erRecords

(B.19)

As a result, the total time cost of this sub-phase is the sum of cost before the ﬁnal pass,
and cost of the ﬁnal pass.
cIntermM ergeT ime =cN umSpillsIntermM erge×
[cSpillBuf f erSize × sLocalDiskReadCost
(B.20)
+ cSpillBuf f erRecords × sCP U Cost
+ cSpillBuf f erSize × sLocalDiskW riteCost]
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cF inalP assT ime =cN umSpills×
[cSpillBuf f erSize × sLocalDiskReadCost
(B.21)
+ cSpillBuf f erRecords × sCP U Cost]
+ cIntermDataSize × sLocalDiskW riteCost
mapM ergeT ime = cIntermM ergeT ime + cF inalP assT ime

B.1.2
B.1.2.1

(B.22)

Reduce Phase
Shufﬂe

Final output from mappers is sent to reducers as map segments. It is assumed that all
map output is distributed evenly to reducers. Hence, the size and number of records for
each map segment can be calculated as follows:
cIntermDataSize
pN umReducers
cIntermDataRecords
cSegmentRecords =
pN umReducers
cSegmentSize =

(B.23)
(B.24)

The size and number of records of total map output data transfered to a reducer is:
cShuf f leSize = mN umM appers × cSegmentSize

(B.25)

cShuf f leRecords = mN umM appers × cSegmentRecords

(B.26)

, where mN umM appers is the number of map tasks that can be measured when a job is
initialized.
Map segments are stored in a shufﬂe buffer located in the memory. The available size
of a buffer is:
cShuf f leBuf f erSize = pShuf f leBuf P erc × pT askM em
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(B.27)

, where pT askM em is the memory size that can be used by a task node deﬁned by
mapred.child.java.opts, and pShuf f leBuf P erc is the percentage for the buffer
deﬁned by mapred.job.shuffle.input.buffer.percent. The underlying Hadoop
merge mechanism will copy segments that are greater than 25% of the cShuf f leBuf f erSize
directly to the local disk other than the shufﬂe buffer. To this end, The following two cases
are considered separately.
Case 1: cSegmentSize < 0.25 × cShuf f erBuf f erSize
In this case, map segments are stored in the shufﬂe buffer. Then the following two
conditions about data in the shufﬂe buffer are checked:
1. The size of data reaches the percentage threshold pShuf f leM ergeP erc.
2. The number of segments is more than the threshold pInM emM ergeT hr.

, where the two thresholds are determined by the following parameters, respectively:
1. mapred.job.shuffle.merge.percent
2. mapred.inmem.merge.threshold

When either of the two conditions holds, segments in the buffer will be spilled to the disk
forming a new shufﬂe ﬁle. Note that Condition 1 has priority over Condition 2. The
number of map segments merged into a single shufﬂe ﬁle is:

cN umSegInShuf f leF ile =

pShuf f leM ergeP erc × cShuf f leBuf f erSize
cSegmentSize
(B.28)
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And it is tuned as follows:
If cN umSegInShuf f leF ile > pInM emM ergeT hr
cN umSegInShuf f leF ile = pInM emM ergeT hr
else If dcN umSegInShuf f leF ilee × cSegmentSize ≤ cShuf f leBuf f erSize
cN umSegInShuf f leF ile = dcN umSegInShuf f leF ilee

else
(B.29)
cN umSegInShuf f leF ile = bcN umSegInShuf f leF ilec
The size and number of records of a shufﬂe ﬁle is:
cShuf f leF ileSize = cN umSegInShuf f leF ile × cSegmentSize (B.30)
cShuf f leF ileRecords = cN umSegInShuf f leF ile × cSegmentRecords (B.31)
cN umShuf f leF iles = b

mN umM appers
c (B.32)
cN umSegInShuf f leF ile

Some segments may still remain in the shufﬂe buffer at the end of merging.

cN umSegmentsInM em = mN umM appers MOD cN umSegInShuf f leF ile
(B.33)
Case 2: cSegmentSize ≥ 0.25 × cShuf f leBuf f erSize
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In this case, map segments are directly store at the local disk, each of which becomes a
shufﬂe ﬁle. The variables in Case 1 has the following values:

cN umSegInShuf f leF ile = 1

(B.34)

cShuf f leF ileSize = cSegmentSize

(B.35)

cShuf f leF ileRecords = cSegmentRecords

(B.36)

cN umShuf f leF iles = mN umM appers

(B.37)

N umSegmentsInM em = 0

(B.38)

Whichever case it is, Hadoop performs a pre-merging on the shufﬂe ﬁles if the number
of shufﬂe ﬁles is larger than a threshold, which is 2 × pSortF actor − 1. The number of
pre-mergings is:

cN umP reM erges =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ 0 , if cN umShuf f leF iles < 2 × pSortF actor − 1
⎪ cN umShuf f leF iles − 2 × pSortF actor + 1
⎪
⎩ b
c + 1 , otherwise
pSortF actor
(B.39)
As a result, both pre-merged and unpre-merged shufﬂe ﬁles exist on the disk in the end
of this sub-phase. For the two types of ﬁles, the amount, size and records can be calculated
as follows:
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cN umM erShf lF iles = cN umP reM erges

(B.40)

cM erShf lF ileSize = pSortF actor × cShuf f leF ileSize

(B.41)

cM erShf lF ileRecords = pSortF actor × cShuf f leF ileRecords

(B.42)

cN umU nmerShf lF iles =
cN umShuf f leF iles − (pSortF actor × cN umP reM erges)
(B.43)
cU nmerShf lF ileSize = cShuf f leF ileSize

(B.44)

cU nmerShf lF ileRecords = cShuf f leF ileRecords

(B.45)

The total time cost of Shufﬂe sub-phase consists of network communication cost, spill
cost (only for Case 1), and pre-merging cost.
cShuf f leSpillT ime =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
0 , for Case 2
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ cN umShuf f leF iles × cShuf f leF ileRecords × sCP U Cost
⎪
⎪
⎪
+cN umShuf f leF iles × cShuf f leF ileSize × sLocalDiskW riteCost
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ , for Case 1
(B.46)
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cShuf f leP reM ergeT ime = cN umM erShf lF iles×
[cM erShf lF ileSize × (sLocalDiskReadCost + sLocalDiskW riteCost)
+ cM erShf lF ileRecords × sCP U Cost]
(B.47)
reShuf f leT ime = cShuf f leSize × sN etworkCost
(B.48)
+ cShuf f leSpillT ime + cShuf f leP reM ergeT ime

B.1.2.2

Merge

Before entering the Merge sub-phase, there are three sets of ﬁles or data segments: (1)
a set of pre-merged shufﬂe ﬁles on the disk, (2) a set of unmerged shufﬂe ﬁles on the disk,
and (3) a set of map segments in the memory. These ﬁles and segments will be merged as
a single input stream for the reduce function. The merging process works in a way similar
to the Map Merge sub-phase. Thus, Equation B.14, B.15 and B.16 are reused in following
calculations which are processed in three steps.
Step1: Eviction of map segments.
Map segments store in the memory will be evicted to the local disk. At this stage, the
total number of shufﬂe ﬁles on the disk is:

cN umShf lF ilesOnDisk = cN umM erShf lF iles+cN umU nmerShf lF iles (B.49)

If the number of shufﬂe ﬁles is less than pSortF actor, the in-memory map segments will
be merged into a single shufﬂe ﬁle and written to the disk. Otherwise, map segments will
stay in the memory and wait to be merged with on-disk shufﬂe ﬁles in Step 2 (i.e., Step
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1 is skipped). The amount, size and records of shufﬂe ﬁles merged from in-memory map
segments can be calculated as follows:
If (cN umShf lF ilesOnDisk < pSortF actor)
cN umShf lF ilesF romM em = 1
cShf lF ilesF romM emSize = cN umSegmentsInM em × cSegmentSize
cShf lF ilesF romM emRecords = cN umSegmentsInM em × cSegmentRecords
cStep1M ergeSize = cShf lF ilesF romM emSize
cStep1M ergeRecords = cShf lF ilesF romM emRecords
else
cN umShf lF ilesF romM em = cN umSegmentsInM em
cShf lF ilesF romM emSize = cSegmentSize
(B.50)
cStep1M ergeSize = 0
cStep1M ergeRecords = 0
The total time cost of Step 1 is:
cStep1T ime =cStep1M ergeRecords × sCP U Cost
(B.51)
+ cStep1M ergeSize × sLocalDiskW riteCost
Step 2: Intermidiate merging. In this step, all shufﬂe ﬁles on the disk will be merged
in several rounds, just like the Map Merge sub-phase. The total number of shufﬂe ﬁles to
be merged is:
cF ilesT oM ergeStep2 = cN umShf lF ilesOnDisk + cN umShf lF ilesF romM em
(B.52)
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The number of intermediate ﬁles to be merged in this sub-phase is:
cN umShf lIntermM erge =
calcN umSpillsIntermM erge(cF ilesT oM ergeStep2, pSortF actor)
(B.53)
However, the sizes of shufﬂe ﬁles to be merged are not uniform, which is different from
the Map merging scenario. The size and records of different shufﬂe ﬁles are calculated
separately. Then the merging size and records of Step 2 are calculated proportionally to
the number of merged intermediate ﬁles.
cN umShf lIntermM erge
×
cF ilesT oM ergeStep2

cStep2M ergeSize =

[cN umM erShf lF iles × cM erShf lF ileSize
+ cN umU merShf lF iles × cU nmerShf lF ileSize
+ cN umShf lF ilesF romM em × cShf lF ilesF romM emSize]
(B.54)
cN umShf lIntermM erge
×
cF ilesT oM ergeStep2

cStep2M ergeRecords =

[cN umM erShf lF iles × cM erShf lF ileRecords
+ cN umU merShf lF iles × cU nmerShf lF ileRecords
+ cN umShf lF ilesF romM em×
cShf lF ilesF romM emRecords]
(B.55)
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The time cost of Step 2 is:
cStep2T ime =cStep2M ergeSize × sLocalDiskReadCost
+ cStep2M ergeRecords × sCP U Cost

(B.56)

+ cStep2M ergeSize × sLocalDiskW riteCost
Step 3: Final merging.
In the ﬁnal step, all shufﬂe ﬁles on the disk will be merged to fed the reduce function.
The read, merging and write cost is related to the entire set of shufﬂe ﬁles. The time cost
of Step 3 is:
cStep3T ime =cShuf f leSize × sLocalDiskReadCost
+ cShuf f leRecords × sCP U Cost

(B.57)

+ cShuf f leSize × sLocalDiskW riteCost
The total time cost of the Merge sub-phase is:

reM ergeT ime = cStep1T ime + cStep2T ime + cStep3T ime

B.1.2.3

(B.58)

Reduce & Write

The merged data is sent to the reduce function for ﬁnal processing. The size and number
of records fed to the reduce function is:

cReduceInBytes = cShuf f leSize

(B.59)

cReduceInRecords = cShuf f leRecords

(B.60)
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The size and number of records of reduce output is:

cReduceOutBytes = cReduceInBytes

(B.61)

cReduceOutRecords = cReduceInRecords

(B.62)

The time cost of Reduce sub-phase is:
reReduceT ime =cReduceInBytes × sLocalDiskReadCost
(B.63)
+ cReduceInRecords × sCP U Cost
The reduce output is then written to HDFS. The write time cost is:
reW riteT ime = cReduceOutBytes × sHdf sW riteCost

(B.64)

, where sHdf sW riteCost is the time cost of writing data to HDFS per byte.

B.1.3

The Complete Job

At this stage, the total cost of a single map task and the total cost of a single reduce
task can be calculated as follows:
singleM apT ime =mapReadT ime + mapM apT ime + mapColletT ime
(B.65)
+ mapSpillT ime + mapM ergeT ime

singleReduceT ime =reShuf f leT ime + reM ergeT ime
(B.66)
+ reReduceT ime + reW riteT ime
The time cost of a complete MapReduce job not only depends on cost of a single map/reduce
task, but it is also determined by the number of mappers and reducers, as tasks can be exe-
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cuted in parallel. Higher level of parallelism will speed up a job execution. As a result, the
total time cost of all map and reduce tasks is:
mN umM appers × singleM apT ime
mN umN odes × pM apSlotsP erN ode

(B.67)

pN umReducers × singleReduceT ime
mN umN odes × pReduceSlotsP erN ode

(B.68)

totalM apT ime =

totalReduceT ime =

, where pM apSlotsP erN ode and pReduceSlotsP erN ode are Hadoop parameters deﬁning the number of map slots and reduce slots per node, respectively. mN umN odes is the
number of nodes in the cluster. Considering the job setup time (sSetupTime) and clean up
time (sCleanUpTime), the total execution time of a job is:

totalJobT ime = sSetupT ime+totalM apT ime+totalReduceT ime+sCleanU pT ime
(B.69)
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